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ABSTRACT
This thesis documents the relationship between U.S. agricultural policy
and anti-hunger legislation under the Reagan Administration, in the
context of diminished federal support for established social programs.
In particular, the thesis examines the impacts that federal policies
have had on community organizations in Boston that run emergency food
programs.
The Reagan Administration's approach to hunger has been "supply-driven"
- motivated by a need to empty federal warehouses of surplus
agricultural commodities. In 1981, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
initiated an ongoing program of mass public distribution of surplus
food. In March 1983, Public Law 98-8 (the Jobs Bill) institutionalized
the distributions, but provided minimal funding for implementation at
the local level. The Jobs Bill also initiated an emergency food and
shelter program, exemplifying another aspect of the Reagan
Administration's approach to hunger: reliance on the voluntary sector.
Providing the services mandated by these regulations has been difficult
for many informal soup kitchens, food pantries, and for many social
service agencies.
Community organizations in Boston have had to absorb many of the costs
associated with implementing these emergency food programs. Faced with
increasing demand for their services, these organizations are
over-burdened, and are changing the nature of their operations in order
to adapt to the requirements of these programs. The availability of the
federal resources may be making the organizations worse off than they
were.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, an uncomfortable partnership has developed
between community organizations and the United States Department of
Agriculture. A growing number of non-profit organizations and agencies are
using federally-owned agricultural commodities in serving their clientele.
Organizations that had little previous experience participating in federal food
programs now find themselves directly affected by federal agricultural policy
and the availability of surplus agricultural products.
The growing role of the federal government in making food available for
use by community organizations has coincided with an increased demand for
the food. A changing economic situation, widespread unemployment and
poverty at the local level have all contributed to the numbers of needy
people in America. Increased numbers of the homeless and the hungry
combined with dwindling financial support for publicly-funded social service
programs have made the role of non-profit community organizations even more
crucial.
Commodities have become available as the needs of the organizations
have changed; and at the same time the availability of the commodities has
changed the needs of the organizations. Because of this, the federal
government as a provider of agricultural commodities has taken on a
particular importance to community organizations working to combat hunger in
their neighborhoods.
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Recent federal policies relating to hunger have had a dual nature,
sometimes trying to solve two separate and distinct problems simultaneously.
In general, the Reagan Administration has conceptualized these programs
"from the top" in order to solve a set of federal-level problems. Community
organizations, on the other hand, have implemented these programs "from the
bottom" with the intention of solving an entirely different set of community-
level problems.
Because of this ambiguity in program rationale, the policies have paid
little attention to the realities of implementation. With the two simultaneous
focuses, it has been the implementors - the community organizations - that
have gotten squeezed in the middle.
The complexity of recent anti-hunger legislation combined with the
complexity of implementation have contributed to making federal feeding
programs very controversial. Community organizations have been discovering
that the benefits of having new resources available for their clientele have
not been without their costs.
Policy-makers sometimes neglect the organizational interests of community
groups, and treat them as mere conduits for funds and services. Without
support for organizational maintenance, community organizations often
sacrifice their long-run development for the short-run provision of services in
the interests of providing services to their clientele.
Looking at organizations that implement policy is a way of focussing on
the effectiveness of policy, and on the capabilities of policies and programs
to deliver services successfully and equitably to people. Attention to the
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needs of organizations responsible for implementation at the local level has an
impact on service delivery and has an impact on the recipients of the
services themselves.
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PART ONE: THE SUPPLY SIDE AND DEMAND SIDE OF FOOD POLICY
CHAPTER ONE
THE SUPPLY SIDE OF FOOD POLICY
On December 22, 1981, three events occurred defining the focus of the
Reagan Administration in creating a new program for feeding the hungry.
The simultaneity of these three events was not coincidental; on the contrary,
understanding their interrelationship is crucial to understanding the impacts
of recent food policy. It is also crucial to understanding the impact that
recent food policy has had on community organizations.
On December 22, 1981, the Secretary of Agriculture, John Block,
received a legislative mandate to reduce the stocks of surplus dairy
commodities stored in federally-owned warehouses. Also on that day,
legislation significantly changed a pilot project set up under the Carter
Administration that had been established to support community organizations
feeding the hungry. The legislation changed this project into an on-going
program capable of large-scale distribution of excess agricultural products to
needy individuals and families. And also on that one day, President Reagan
announced that he would release thirty million pounds of surplus cheese from
federal warehouses. This cheese would be available to nonprofit organizations
for distribution to the needy.
Two of these three events occurred when President Reagan signed into
law the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981.1 Although relatively minor within
the context of the entire legislation, two of the provisions of this Act were
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to have a significant impact on community organizations. Through these
provisions, local agencies would feel the impacts of U.S. agricultural policy.
Title I of the Act regulated the dairy industry. A short paragraph
within the title (section 106) crystallized the connections between the dairy
industry and dairy policy and the Administration's concern over the high cost
of government. Section 106 reinforced the authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture to "reduce inventories of dairy products" held by the federally
owned and rented storehouses of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).
The law encouraged the Secretary to use this authority "to the fullest extent
practicable . . . so as to reduce net Commodity Credit Corporation
expenditures" for storage costs connected to the Administration's milk price
support program. 2
The legislation mandated Secretary Block to take action to reduce the
government's cost of storing dairy products. Congress and the Reagan
Administration were notably concerned that the amount of food in the
warehouses was growing rapidly, and the costs associated with storage were
escalating as well.
The enormous stocks of dairy products held in the CCC warehouses were
a direct result of the existing dairy price support system. This system,
established in 1949 to cushion the dairy industry from market price
fluctuations, "explicitly puts a floor under the price of manufacturing grade
milk and thus maintains a floor under all milk prices."3 Under the price
support system, the CCC purchases any butter, cheese and nonfat dry milk
that commercial producers will not (or cannot) purchase at the government-set
purchase prices. In other words, the government sets a price, and then
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purchases enough dairy products in the market to maintain that price. The
government holds the dairy products at its own expense in warehouses owned
or leased by the CCC.4
At the time of the Congressional debates on the Agriculture and Food
Act of 1981, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry
reported that the federal government would donate to various food programs
(including the School Lunch Program and foreign aid) over 250 billion pounds
of milk from the CCC inventories. These donations, however, would
represent only 15% of the total CCC-owned dairy stocks. 5 USDA estimated
that the value of the remaining 85% of the dairy products held in CCC's
storage facilities was over $1.1 billion. 6 Given the storage costs associated
with these massive inventories, Congressional alarm was not surprising.
The obvious method to control the costs of commodity storage would be
to reduce the inventory. Inventory reduction could happen either by
decreasing the amount going into storage, or increasing the amount going out.
Significantly decreasing the amount of agricultural commodities purchased
by the government going into storage would require significantly restructuring
the entire dairy and price support system. Since this radical change would
not happen at this point under the Reagan Administration, Congress could
only slightly affect the commodity flows going into storage. The Agriculture
and Food Act of 1981 had a small effect by slightly changing the price
support level. 7
The Act made a more significant change, however, by trying to increase
the quantity of commodities pulled out of storage. In fact, there were four
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recommendations (besides the change in the level of price support) included in
the Senate Committee's report. Three of the recommendations suggested
minor shifts in the CCC's accounting procedures. The fourth recommendation
suggested increasing the quantities of surplus dairy products removed from
the inventories. "In summary," the report read, "it is the Committee's belief
that the cost expenditures of the dairy program can be reduced. . . . The
Committee feels that consideration should be given to actions such as . . .
[recognizing] that outlets for CCC dairy inventories are limited and pursue
aggressively additional outlets."8
Because of these concerns, section 106 of the 1981 Act pushed the
Secretary of Agriculture to reduce the amounts of food held by the CCC,
and encouraged him to develop new channels for the use of the food.
According to a fact sheet published by the USDA at this time, the
government-held dairy products had already saturated their current markets.
Existing outlets for cheese (in particular), including all of the domestic food
programs (such as the School Lunch Program) and including federal sales to
the military, could absorb a maximum of approximately 134 million pounds a
year. There were still 560 million pounds of cheese left in the warehouses in
"uncommitted inventory." Furthermore, during the coming year (1982), the
CCC would have to purchase additional dairy products (cheese, butter, milk)
under the price support system, and add these products to the inventories. 9
Current markets for the dairy commodities were hardly making a dent in the
surpluses in storage.
Market saturation was not the only problem faced by the Secretary in
finding new channels for the food. Some of the existing food was spoiling.
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Of the 560 million pounds of surplus cheese, 325 million was processed
"American" cheese, and 235 million pounds was unprocessed Cheddar. 10 The
American cheese has a long shelf life because of the extra processing it
undergoes; the Cheddar is prone to spoilage. This meant that in order not to
waste the food, the Secretary would have to find new "outlets" quickly.
Implicit in section 106, therefore, was also the need for speed.
Section 106 of the 1981 Agriculture and Food Act provided the mandate
to reduce stored agricultural surplus, but it did not provide the mechanism.
Section 1114 of Title XI in the Act, however, created the mechanism by
slightly (but significantly) modifying an existing federal project.
Section 1114 was entitled: "Distribution of Surplus Commodities; Special
Nutrition Projects." In part (a) of this section, Congress determined that
surplus agricultural commodities "acquired under the price support programs"
would be "available without charge or credit" to a variety of nutrition
programs including "food banks participating in the special nutrition projects
established under section 211 of the Agricultural Act of 1980."11 The
important part of section 1114 is that it included "food banks" among those
organizations and programs eligible for the "free" commodities.
"Food bank" is a term usually used to describe a particular type of
organization serving as a clearinghouse for surplus or salvage food, and
offering this low-cost food to nonprofit organizations serving those in need.
As used in section 211 of the Agricultural Act of 1980, the term "food bank"
most probably referred to that type of clearinghouse. As referenced by .
section 1114 of the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, however, the term
was never clearly defined. It was unclear whether the 1981 legislation
- 14 -
referred to true food "banks," or whether it referred simply to any
organization providing food to those in need. The lack of clarity, although
confusing, gave the USDA latitude in designing a mechanism for distributing
its surplus commodities.
It is significant that section 1114 of the 1981 Act specifically mentions
food banks. Food banks - when defined liberally - could be the new and
expanded outlet for agricultural commodities. In order to use the food banks
for this purpose, however, section 1114 had to modify section 211 of the
Agricultural Act of 1980. As it stood, section 211 of the 1980 Act would
not provide the needed mechanism for distributing agricultural surplus on a
large scale.
Although it was the first time federal legislation ever mentioned "food
banks," section 211 of the Agricultural Act of 1980 was a relatively
insignificant section of the 1980 law. It was a small section in Title II, never
once mentioned in the five House reports submitted with the bill. 1 2 The
section set up "demonstration projects to provide agricultural commodities and
other foods . . . to community food banks for emergency food box
distribution to needy individuals and families." 1 3
In modifying the Food Bank Demonstration Project of 1980 so as to use
food banks as a mechanism for distributing surplus, section 1114 of the
Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 made two basic changes. First, the 1981
amendments turned the short-term pilot project into an on-going established
program. And second, the 1981 amendments shifted the focus of the modified
projects away from an experiment on the role of food banks towards a more
narrow focus on the distribution of agricultural surplus.
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Whereas the 1980 Act clearly described a short-term experiment, section
1114 of the 1981 Act changed the language of the project in a variety of
ways. First of all, throughout the section the words "special nutrition
projects" replaced the words "demonstration projects."1 4 Whereas a
"demonstration project" is an experiment, a "special nutrition project" is the
name given to any of a number of on-going federal food programs. Congress
also shifted the time frame of the project, extending it until (at least)
January 1, 1984. The funding available for the project. expanded from
$356,000 to "such sums as may be necessary" to carry out the program.15
These amendments were all evidence that the pilot project was soon to
become the mechanism for a new federal food program.
Not only did the modifications in section 1114 subsume the original food
bank demonstration project, it also changed the focus. The most obvious
modification was that the 1981 Act changed the title of the food bank
project. No longer would the title of section 106 be "Food Bank
Demonstration Projects"; instead, section 1114 stated that "the heading for
sec. 211 of the Agriculture Act of 1980 is amended to read as follows:
'Distribution of Excess Agricultural Commodities Through Community Food
Banks."' 1 6
Under this legislation, the term "food banking" as used in legislation and
regulations took on both a new meaning and a new purpose. The Food and
Agriculture Act of 1981 described a shift in emphasis by focussing on the
community food banks' role in providing assistance to the federal government
as distributors of federally-owned agricultural surplus.
On December 22, 1981, the U.S. Department of Agriculture received both
a mandate and a mechanism to lessen the burden of federally-owned
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agricultural surplus. Secretary Block received a legislative push to "reduce
inventories", and legislation transformed the Food Bank Demonstration Project
into a "special nutrition project" for the "Distribution of Excess Agricultural
Commodities." With a mandate to distribute, and a mechanism for
distribution, all that was remaining was the mobilization of the commodities.
Later on, on that same day, President Reagan formally mobilized
agricultural commodities for distribution. He said:
The Dairy Price Support Program in this country has resulted
in the stockpiling of millions upon millions of pounds of cheese
by the Commodity Credit Corporation. At a time when
American families are under increasing financial pressure, their
government cannot sit by and watch millions of pounds of food
turn to waste.
I am authorizing today the immediate release of 30 million
pounds from the CCC inventory. The cheese will be delivered
to the States that request it and will be distributed free to
the needy by nonprofit groups.
The 1981 farm bill I signed today will slow the rise in price
support levels, but even under this bill, surpluses will continue
to pile up. A total of more than 560 million pounds of cheese
has already been consigned to warehouses, so more
distributions may be necessary as we continue our drive to
root out waste in government and make the best possible use
of our Nation's resources. 1 7
This presidential statement was the third and final piece that initiated
the process newly bringing community organizations into the sphere of
influence of U.S. agricultural policy. President Reagan made it very clear in
his announcement that his major concern was the existence of persistent
agricultural surplus. The purpose of feeding the hungry with agricultural
surplus was that it would reduce the storage costs of the stockpiled food.
Under these assumptions, feeding the needy was a means to an end, not
an end in itself. The existence of "American families under increasing
- 17 -
financial pressure" did not prompt the release of the food. It was a push
from the supply side of food policy that gave momentum to the availability of
surplus commodities for the needy.
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CHAPTER TWO
A SUPPLY SIDE FOOD PROGRAM
Between December 22, 1981 and March 24, 1983 the Reagan
Administration continued to make efforts to empty its stocks of surplus
agricultural commodities. One week after the December 22 announcement,
the first 30 million pounds of cheese were available. 1 Each state designated
an agency for managing the distribution, usually the state agency experienced
in distributing federal commodities for use in established group meals
programs (school food programs, charitable meals programs, elderly meals
programs).
In Massachusetts, for example, the Bureau of Nutrition Education and
School Food Services at the Department of Education was responsible for
overseeing the federal food donations to the school food programs as well as
the donations to other "eligible outlets." According to a "Legislative Outline
of the Food Distribution Program" compiled by the USDA in December 1979,
these "outlets" included schools, child care institutions, nonprofit summer
camps, service institutions for the summer food programs, and charitable
institutions providing prepared group meals to needy individuals. 2 Because
the Department of Education was the only agency dealing with USDA-donated
food, when the dairy distribution program began it went to that agency
(rather than to the Department of Public Welfare or a purchasing
department). 3
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By administering the surplus dairy distributions through the same
department responsible for child care feeding programs and meals programs
for senior citizens, the organizational agenda for this program was shifting.
People concerned with administering programs meant primarily to feed people
were running a program clearly established as a means of lowering federal
storage costs.
In the view of Ed Stockwell, the regional administrator of the program
for the entire USDA Northeast Region, the program's purpose was equally
divided between reducing federal surpluses and feeding the needy. 4 At the
next level down the chain of implementation, in the view of Education
Specialist Joanne Morrissey, the official at the Massachusetts Department of
Education administering the commodities distributions, the distributions were
the President's emergency response to a public demand for the release of
surplus food. 5 At the top of the policy chain, the program was supply
driven. As the process filtered down the state administrative apparatus, it
began to acquire the characteristics of a program generated by public
demand.
Partly because the program was generated from this "top-down"
perspective, there was no federal funding available for implementation. The
federal government paid the costs of transporting the food from the
federally-owned CCC storehouses to the centralized warehouses run by the
states. Individual states were responsible for all of the costs incurred at the
state and local levels, and they were fully responsible for arranging and
financing their own distributions.6
As further evidence that the concerns of the Reagan Administration
focussed more on an emergency need to release the food than on an
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emergency need to distribute it to the hungry, USDA made its public
announcement about releasing the cheese before having notified the states
that they were going to have to distribute it. Morrissey at the Department
of Education was deluged with calls from the public about the free cheese;
this put pressure on her to implement a distribution quickly, without the
opportunity for careful planning. 7
It was very difficult for the state administrators to find agencies willing
to handle the distributions, even though the flexibility built into the
regulations gave the state administrators latitude in finding suitable outlets.
With the broadened meaning of "food bank," there was no urgency to
convince the existing true food banks in Massachusetts (Boston and Worcester)
to participate in the program. It would be appropriate within the scope of
the legislation to look for agencies other than true "food banks" to manage
the distributions. This was particularly necessary in Boston since the true
"food bank" in the area, the Boston Food Bank, refused to participate.
According to Nan Johnson, Agency Relations Manager at the Boston Food
Bank, the Boston Food Bank chose not to participate in the surplus
distributions for three main reasons. First of all, they were politically
opposed to a program that, in effect, supported the federal agricultural price
support system. To the people at the Food Bank, the supply driven focus of
the commodity distributions was incompatible with an attempt to fill real
needs at the local level. A second concern they had about the distributions
was that they felt it "ridiculous" for women with children and for the elderly
to stand in line for five pounds of cheese (the allocation for a small family).
Furthermore, the people at the Food Bank thought that participating in the
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surplus dairy distributions would be an "unbearable burden" to the Food
Bank's staff. According to their calculations, the costs to the organization in
terms of staff time used and the opportunity costs of shutting down their
operations to do the distributions - thereby foregoing operating revenues -
exceeded the benefits of the value of the small amounts of food distributed
to the needy. 8
Larry Meyer, Executive Director of the Boston Food Bank, recalled
discussing participation in the first dairy distribution at an East Coast
Regional Food Bank Directors' meeting. The food banks participating in that
meeting decided that participation would have been very expensive, and that
because of the lack of federal funds available for implementation, the
individual organizations would have had to heavily subsidize the program from
their own funds. According to Meyer, the program had minimal benefits for
anyone, and was just a "little bit of public relations for Reagan."?9 The local
level agency directors that were critics of the program (like Meyer)
determined that the program, because of the way it was set up from the
start, would never provide any substantial benefit to the poor and hungry,
nor to the organizations distributing the commodities. In their analysis, the
prime beneficiaries were the price support system and the federal
government's storage bills. They were particularly suspicious of the Reagan
Administration's motives for initiating the commodities distributions given the
drastic reductions in other food and nutrition programs. There were rumors
at the time that commodities distributions would expand at the expense of
other programs like School Lunch and Food Stamps.
The concerns of most agencies, however, were pragmatic rather than
political. The lack of funding for storage and staff meant that it would
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actually cost the agencies a substantial amount to distribute the "free"
product. At this early point in the program in Massachusetts (early 1982),
not only were there no federal funds forthcoming for distribution, the state
legislature was not yet authorizing funds to pay for the storage of the cheese
in its five warehouses (Charlestown, South. Boston, Brockton, Worcester,
Springfield). Federal funds paid to put the cheese into those warehouses, but
state funds were necessary to keep it there. The uncertainty about state
funding and the uncertainty about local funding made it difficult to plan at
both levels.
Morrissey's concern, in identifying agencies to handle the distribution, was
to serve the entire state. Persuaded by the state Executive Office of
Communities and Development, she attempted to use the Community Action
Program (CAP) agencies because of their distribution state-wide.1 0 The lack
of enthusiasm for participating on the part of the CAPs forced the state to
diversify. Some CAP agencies in come areas participated, but Morrissey had
to rely on other agencies as well. In Framingham, for example, the Boy
Scouts ran the distributions. In Boston, the Community Schools ran them.
Being able to use the Community Schools as distributors of the
commodities is a clear example of the organizational discretion left in the
regulations. Community Schools are in no way "food banks," at least in the
traditional sense of the word. They are not even food "pantries" -
organizations giving several days' worth of groceries to needy individuals on
an emergency basis. Community Schools are not emergency food providers at
all; they are community educational centers that offer a wide variety of
adult and continuing education courses. And incidentally, some Community
Schools also serve as sites for hot meals programs for senior citizens.
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Because this was a program designed to relieve the federal warehouses
of surplus commodities, the choice of the Community Schools - although
seemingly illogical - was perfectly rational. The idea was to use whatever
existing network was available, whether it was an emergency food providing
network or not. The Community School network effectively covered the
entire city, meaning they would be able to get the surplus food out to all the
neighborhoods. Furthermore, the schools were familiar with the Department
of Education, and were familiar with federal commodities since they used
donated commodities in their elderly meals programs.
The first 30 million pounds of cheese released in the beginning of 1982
hardly made a dent in the dairy surpluses in federal storage. Just over two
months after the first release of food, USDA announced that "at least an
additional 70 million pounds of surplus process cheese" was available for
distribution. The interesting addition to this announcement was that the
USDA notice specifically said that "there is no limitation on the amount of
cheese which may be requested by a State agency. 11l
That there was (essentially) an unlimited amount of food available was
distinctive of this sort program - a program pulled along by the availability
of supply rather than by the exigencies of demand. In most federal food
programs designed expressly to meet a popular need, regulations cap the
supply of the available service in some way, either by defining limited
eligibility standards for an entitlement or by limiting funding to restrict the
numbers of participants. (The Food Stamp program is an example of the
former, and the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and
Children an example of the latter.) The dynamic in this surplus dairy program
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was reversed: USDA hoped that the available supply would be able to
generate a demand for the commodities, thereby reducing the surpluses.
The Presidential order originally releasing the cheese stated nothing
about eligibility for the commodities. His statement simply said that people
must be "needy." In the first months of 1982, the New England Regional
Office of the USDA gave suggestions to the various state commodities
distribution agencies as to what sorts of people might be "needy."1t 2 Each
state, however, was able to use its own discretion in setting criteria for
eligibility.
For the first round of deliveries in Massachusetts in early 1982, the
Department of Education made the determination that there would be state-
wide eligibility requirements for anyone wishing to receive the cheese. This
first round of surplus cheese could go to anyone already participating in one
of approximately nine entitlement programs. After the distribution, however,
the Department of Education recognized that this system was not allowing
large numbers of potentially eligible low-income people (especially senior
citizens) to receive the cheese, particularly those people not already
participating in entitlement programs.
At the same time that Massachusetts was trying to expand their
distribution, the regional office of the USDA was pushing the individual states
to distribute as much cheese as possible. In the second round of cheese
distribution, Massachusetts expanded the definition of program eligibility.
This time anyone whose income fell within the guidelines for eligibility to
receive fuel assistance (whether they received fuel assistance or not) would
be eligible to receive cheese. People could "self-declare" their income (that
- 27 -
is, sign an affidavit declaring that they were within income eligibility
guidelines, without having to provide written documentation of income). This
second round of distribution extended the program - the Department of
Education opened up the eligibility restrictions and expanded the publicity
about the distributions to agencies around the state. 1 3
The availability of the supply continued to push along the program. On
June 15, 1982, the USDA made available another 120 million pounds of surplus
cheese. Again, the amount was really just a low estimate of the quantity
available because again, there was no limit on the amount of cheese the
states could request.14 According to Morrissey, at this point there really
was no limit - she was able to order as much cheese as she wanted.1 5 On
July 23, USDA also made available "at least 50 million pounds of surplus
butter." 1 6 Not only was the USDA trying to decrease its stocks of the 500
pound barrels of cheese in its warehouses, but also its stocks of 68 pound
blocks of butter.
Seven months after the initial release of surplus dairy commodities, the
USDA started to tighten the implementation of the program. Although there
were still no provisions supporting local distribution, the regulations required
that "food banks" receiving surplus butter have "adequate freezer facilities or
the ability to distribute [the butter] within 48 hours of receipt."1 7 The
perishability of the commodities demanded swift local response.
The state and local agencies, however, would still have to bear the costs
of implementing these requirements. There was still no support available to
buy freezers, pay electric bills to keep the freezers running, or hire staff to
distribute the products.
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On September 8, 1982, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1982. Although this Act did not release more
commodities, it did include a provision further regularizing the availability of
the supply. Section 110 of the Act provided that the CCC add "distribution
to needy households in the U.S." to the list of eligible recipients for dairy
products acquired under the price support programs.1 8 This provision
formally established the ongoing authority of the federal government to
include household distribution as a means of "preventing waste" of surplus
commodities.
One year after the release of the first commodities for household
distribution, on December 3, 1982 the USDA announced the release of another
"unlimited" amount of butter and cheese. There would be "at least 280
million pounds of process cheese and 75 million pounds of butter to agencies
of State governments which request it for distribution to eligible
recipients. . . . There is no limitation on the amount of cheese and butter
which may be requested by a State agency."19
Joanne Morrissey at the Massachusetts Department of Education initially
thought that the dairy distribution was going to be a temporary, one-time-
only program. 2 0 She soon realized that although impermanent and episodic,
the program was ongoing. USDA continued to release commodities, and there
was no real indication that they were going to stop.
An analysis of the surplus dairy program by the General Accounting
Office stated:
In December 1981, USDA initiated a special program to
distribute federally owned cheese and butter to needy
households throughout the Nation. . . . Despite this use,
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quantities purchased under the dairy price support program
have been mounting rapidly. . . . Despite USDA's distributing
during 1982 of 135 million pounds of cheese and 8.2 million
pounds of butter, collectively valued at $275 million, USDA
was holding in its uncommitted inventory a year later about
776 million pounds of cheese valued at about $1 billion and
about 368 million pounds of butter worth about $560 million.
The Secretary of Agriculture stated in December 1982 that
"The increasing size of the inventories makes it imperative
that we do all we can to use these surpluses." In this regard,
he announced that the distribution of surplus cheese and
butter would continue through December 1983. He also
claimed that the distribution of these products in 1982 had
reached nearly 10 million people. 2 1
Pushed on by a seemingly endless supply, the only limits on the
distributions were the logistical limits of getting the food out. As an article
in the New York Times pointed out in early 1983, "The Agriculture
Department, in its latest efforts to reduce huge grain and dairy surpluses,
has found it neither cheap nor easy to give them away." The article pointed
out that it cost over $1.50 to acquire, package and distribute each pound of
butter or cheese to the states. 2 2 And these costs were only the federal
costs; a true estimate of the cost of the program would have to include all
of the state costs and all of the costs to the local agencies actually doing
the distributions.
Along with hidden costs, there were other logistical limits to the program
as well. The logistical problems at all levels were the major inhibitors to the
program's expansion. At the federal level, the government had to process
and package the food into units appropriate for household consumption. They
had to cut five hundred pound barrels of cheese into five pound blocks.
They had to process Cheddar cheese into American cheese. They had to cut
butter into two pound pieces. The USDA had contracts with commerical food
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manufacturers to do the processing, but factory capacity limited the food
industry's involvement. According to one source at the USDA, the capital
investment required for these particular processing operations is quite
extensive. With the unreliability of a continuous supply, the food processors
were hesitant to invest in capital expansion. 23
At the state level, administrators had to ready warehouses and storage
space, and had to develop consistent local distribution networks. The state
already had a network of warehouses, but the funding for them was
dependent upon the state's budgetary cycle. Even more fundamentally, the
state needed to be sure it had storage space for millions of pounds of
cheese.
At the local level, community organizations had to find donated space,
donated personnel, donated publicity, and available time to administer mass
public distributions. The distributions usually required extensive coordinated
effort of several agencies and the shared contributions of halls for the
distribution, publicity, and volunteers. These limitations on the program at
the local level were starting to limit the speed of the implementation of the
program.
The dairy surpluses, in spite of mass distributions, were still growing.
Because of the pressures placed by the supply, the distribution program -
designed to reduce these surpluses - would have to continue. During the
next year, however, there were going to be social, political, and economic
changes that would have a significant impact on the other side of food
policy. The coming year would see increased pressure from the demand side.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEMAND SIDE OF FOOD POLICY
During the time that the federal government was making available surplus
dairy commodities for household distribution, other trends were also having an
important impact on the politics of food. The Reagan Administration was
making deep cuts in the funding of established social programs, and there was
a growing awareness of and a growing concern about the existence of hunger
in the United States.
In 1981 and 1982, Congress and the Reagan Administration made
significant reductions in the federal funding available for human service
programs. Included in the reductions were more than two billion dollars
worth of services cut from the Food Stamp program, 1.5 billion dollars a year
cut from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, and a nearly
30% reduction in the school lunch program.1 According to an analysis made
in early 1983 by staff members of the Washington-based Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities:
Two years of budget cuts, along with the most severe
recession in forty years, have lowered the standard of living
of millions of Americans who are already below the poverty
line. A third year of budget cuts would aggravate this
situation further for millions of elderly, disabled, children, and
women raising children where no other parent is resent - the
groups who constitute the bulk of America's poor.
The cuts in the human services budget were very controversial, and the
media continually reminded the public of the potential impacts of service
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reductions on the health and well-being of the American people. There was
public debate about the impact of the reductions in social services on the
public health. A study by another Washington-based advocacy group, the
Food Research and Action Center, noted that some states were experiencing
a rise in their infant mortality rates. According to an article in the
New York Times, "after years of progress, there are signs that the death
rates are edging up again. And some critics say that the Reagan
Administration's priorities - its economic policies as well as budget cutbacks
it has sought in health care programs - are to blame." 3
Numerous community organizations across the country reported increased
demand for their services. In November 1982 a report on domestic hunger
cited an example:
St. Ignatius Roman Catholic Church in Baltimore, Md., opens
its social services center at 6 a.m. every day. But lately,
homeless and poor people have been arriving even earlier.
They wait outside because they have no other place to go and
they know they won't be turned away.
The center's policy of helping all people who seek it is
becoming harder to maintain. Since cutbacks in federal
assistance program benefits began taking effect in October
1981, the number of people requesting food, clothing, cash or
simply a warm place to stay has tripled. 4
A survey of emergency food programs conducted in the spring of 1983
demonstrated that between February 1982 and February 1983, more than half
of the 161 programs surveyed experienced at least a 50% increase in the
number of meals provided. 5 Throughout the nation, local organizations were
feeling the impact of increased demands for their services.
There was growing public concern about increased poverty, and there was
growing public concern about increased hunger brought about by the poverty.
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On November 12, 1982 the Wall Street Journal published an article about the
"new poor" subtitled "Soup Kitchens and Suicides." This article described the
"ugly specter of the homeless poor" in the Sun Belt states - newly-
unemployed people who migrated south in the hopes of finding jobs.
According to the article, "A recent report by the U.S. Conference of Mayors
says thousands of families have been evicted from their homes and are living
in cars, campgrounds, tents and rescue missions. The report notes that
federal welfare programs that would have once kept such families afloat have
been sharply cut back.? 6
The report by the U.S. Conference of Mayors also highlighted severe
emergency needs for food in major American cities. It looked at the
combined effects of the reductions in federal support for human service
programs, the current economic situation, and the instances of widespread
unemployment. In the 55 cities surveyed, the report found that "in none of
the human service areas examined was even 50 percent of the eligible
population served in FY81 or FY82.? 7
On December 7, 1982 the Mayor of Detroit,. Coleman Young, declared a
"State of Emergency" for Detroit, and announced that the city was going to
initiate a survival program to help poor and hungry Detroiters through the
coming "winter of crisis.? 8
One month later, a major article in the New York Times Magazine on
January 2, 1983 was entitled: "Once Again, Hunger Troubles America."
According to this article:
Although no one knows precisely how many Americans are
going hungry or how many are malnourished, there is evidence
that, as poverty is increasing, so is hunger.. A sluggish
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economy and the highest unemployment rate since the
Depression have aggravated the hardships of the poor and
added to their ranks. And according to many experts, the
Reagan Administration's budget cuts have also hurt the poor. 9
The increasing attention of the media and the growing involvement of
major-city mayors in publicizing the growing incidence of hunger were
crucial in pushing Congress to acknowledge that there was a growing
"demand side" of food and hunger policy.
By the end of February, 1983 Representative Leon Panetta, chair of the
House Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition
began a series of public hearings "in an effort to take an objective look at
the issue of hunger in America."1 0 At one of the hearings, John Mattingly of
the Cleveland Interchurch Council testified: "We served [food to) 17,000 in
June, 1982. In December, we served 48,000. We are facing a true hunger
crisis in Cleveland. Five years ago . . . we were serving 65 people a night a
free meal. Right now we are serving between 200-300 people a night."11 At
that same hearing, Major Paul Kelly of the Salvation Army asserted that
"never has hunger been more active in Northern Ohio than right now."12
Along with testimony on the extent of hunger throughout the U.S.,
testimony at Rep. Panetta's hearing also discussed the role of surplus dairy
distributions in combatting hunger. Many of the witnesses cited the
inadequacy of commodities distributions in alleviating the chronic hunger
problem. Major Kelly of Cleveland asserted: "The Salvation Army distributed
a little over one million pounds of food in Cuyahoga County this past year
and we really cannot satisfy the cry for more. . . . I think the situation is so
desperate that almost any food you have available we will take and use."13
John Mattingly, also of Cleveland, stated, "Last year we faced 102 percent
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increase in the amount of food we distributed . . . . I think indeed we should
provide access to surplus commodities of all sorts."14
In Boston as well, there was evidence of increased hunger, and local
organizations were feeling the push of increasing demand for their services.
On November 4, 1982 columnist Ian Menzies wrote about hunger in Boston.
"Hunger in Boston is not a myth. It exists," he wrote, "and is growing."
Menzies went on to describe a recent meeting sponsored by the United
Community Planning Council, the independent planning and research arm of
the United Way. This meeting "revealed . . . a network of volunteers, plus a
few paid personnel struggling to meet an escalating human need, without help
from Boston, municipalities, or the Legislature."15
At the end of this article, Menzies published the phone number of Project
Bread, a nonprofit organization that provides funding to groups that feed the
needy. Within a week of the publication of this article, Project Bread
received over $3000 in donations from individuals concerned about hunger.
On November 25, Menzies wrote another column, remarking on the public's
rapid response. He also noted the impact that this sudden publicity was
having on local community organizations. He mentioned that Geno Ballotti,
director of the Permanent Charity Fund - a local foundation - was "well
aware that that the existing network of local agencies is the one best
equipped to do their job. But the men and women who work without fanfare
for the agencies are a bit overwhelmed by the sudden attention, as well as a
bit concerned that they could lose their identity." Permanent Charity
intended to donate several thousand dollars to Project Bread for the use of
local feeding organizations and, according to Menzies, "it is hoped that the
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help offered by the Permanent Charities Fund can be comfortably accepted
for the benefit of those who need it most." 1 6 Even though the public
awareness was important for these community organizations working to feed
the hungry, their very limited resources, and limited organizational capacities
provided them little room for expansion.
Very quickly, and in large part prompted by publicity in the local media,
hunger and the needs of organizations feeding the hungry became a major
part of the local public agenda. With assistance from the Permanent Charity
Fund, Project Bread set up the Hunger Hotline, an advocacy and referral
organization created explicitly to assist local agencies feeding the hungry.
Establishing the Hotline was very significant for these small organizations.
It was a statement that there needed to be some mechanism to connect and
coordinate all the various actors in the emergency feeding network. It was a
statement that this informal network of informal organizations was starting to
play an important role in the delivery of social services. And furthermore, it
was evident that without an organizational advocate like the Hotline, these
small, isolated organizations would have no voice.
An additional impetus to public awareness of hunger was early in 1983
when the newly-elected Dukakis administration pledged to make homelessness
and hunger a priority in the coming years. One of Governor Dukakis' first
actions was to set up an Advisory Committee on the Homeless to determine
actions that would be appropriate at the state level to combat homelessness
and hunger.
Jo-Ann Eccher, Coordinator of the newly-formed Hunger Hotline, chaired
the Food Subcommittee of the Governor's Advisory Committee. Of the nine
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recommendations made by this subcommittee in the Interim Report to the
Governor, one recommendation was about the surplus dairy distributions. The
recommendation read:
The Department of Education must receive sufficient monies to
develop an effective distribution plan for surplus government
commodities. In addition, administrative and transportation
costs of those private agencies involved in the distribution
process must be met. 17
The substance of this recommendation is crucial for understanding the
important issues raised by the commodities programs in the light of the
increasing public awareness of hunger in the U.S. One of the main problems
with the distributions was their impact on local agencies. The distribution
plan was by its very nature sporadic, and dependent upon the willingness of
agencies to make the effort to participate in the program. The lack of
funding for implementation - meaning the lack of administrative or
transportation funds - made the program prohibitively expensive for most
agencies. This in turn made it difficult for the surplus dairy distributions to
have a meaningful impact on hunger.
On March 22, 1983, Eccher brought these concerns to Congress by
submitting testimony to Rep. Panetta's Subcommittee for a public hearing in
Washington, D.C. Her testimony stated:
Over one million pounds of surplus processed cheese and a half
a million pounds of butter will be distributed to the poor of
Massachusetts early this year. . . . Emergency soup kitchens,
food banks and food pantries have not benefited from previous
distribution due to lack of appropriated funds to cover
administrative, storage and transportation costs of the
Commodities. Food pantries and soup kitchens which are
largely the noble efforts of churches, synagogues and nonprofit
social service agencies have the volunteers but not the funds
to cover distributing Commodities.18
Advocates for the poor and advocates for emergency food providers were
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pushing the surplus distribution program to better meet the needs of the
community. Congress, however, had not set up the program to meet the
needs of the hungry, nor had it set up the program to meet the needs of
community organizations. What the advocates were trying to do was to mold
the commodities distribution program into an effective anti-hunger program:
mold it into a program that would be a Congressional response to the demand
for food, not the response to an excessive supply.
The public awareness of hunger and the demand for a federal response
were the political climate and the context in which Congress met in March
1983. It was these sorts of issues that prompted Congress to propose,
debate, and pass Public Law 98-8, the "Jobs Bill." The overwhelming needs
of the demand side of food and hunger policy were pushing against the supply
side.
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PART TWO: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE
CHAPTER FOUR
A LIMITED RESPONSE TO THE DEMAND SIDE
On March 24, 1983 Congress passed Public Law 98-8, the Emergency Job
Appropriations ("the Jobs Bill"). This bill was a reaction to public concerns
about hunger in the U.S. The Jobs Bill was important in two ways: First, it
expanded and increased some of the existing programs serving the needy; and
second, it responded to some of the needs of the local organizations that
were actually providing those services. In many ways, the Jobs Bill came
about as a response to the demand side of social welfare and food policy.
As stated March 7 in a report by the Senate Appropriations Committee, "in
providing additional sums for humanitarian assistance, the Committee is
responding to the plight of those who are ill-housed, hungry, or in need of
health care."1
The Jobs Bill was a long and complex piece of legislation, with wide-
ranging provisions establishing public works projects and expanding the
participation levels of a several social service programs. There were three
separate provisions, however, that were explicitly important for community
organizations feeding the hungry.
The first of these provisions was in Title I, in a section entitled
"Distribution of Agricultural Commodities." This section provided $75 million
"to acquire and distribute surplus agricultural commodities in areas of high
unemployment for use in cooperative emergency feeding facilities for indigent
persons."2
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Title I commodities were not the surplus price support commodities
distributed to households. Title I of the Jobs Bill gave the Secretary of
Agriculture funds to buy specific commodities - called "nonbasic perishable"
commodities - that were surplus in the market. These commodities were
available only for use by organizations providing prepared meals in a group
setting to needy individuals. Unlike the dairy products distributed for
household consumption, an organization using the Title I commodities had to
prepare and serve them on the organization's premises.
Organizations providing group meals to the poor had always been eligible
for USDA commodities through the Food Distribution Program - a program
which provided charitable organizations preparing group meals with a variety
of USDA commodities (dairy, grain, cereal, peanut products, oil) purchased
under USDA price support programs. 3 Title I of the Jobs Bill made a wider
variety of commodities (such as meats, poultry, fruits and vegetables)
available to these organizations.
Congress limited the allocation of funds for Title I foods, based on a
formula derived from the number of unemployed persons in each state. 4 Just
as with other federal programs designed to meet a demand, there was a limit
to participation - this time in the form of a cap on ivailable funds. The
legislation not only limited funding, but also the duration of the Title I
program. Under the Jobs Bill, the expanded availability of these nonbasic
perishable surplus removal commodities would only last until September 30,
1983.5 This provision in Title I was an "emergency" program, intended to
address a supposedly acute hunger problem.
Because the Title I foods were available on a temporary basis under
"emergency" circumstances, Title I had no provisions for funding for local
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organizations. The $75 million allotted in the legislation (of which
Massachusetts received $1,361,599) was to go entirely to pay for food.
Although Title II of the Jobs Bill did include a provision for costs associated
with distributing the food (see Chapter Five below), the Title II money went
to pay for more than just the Title I commodities. Thus, under Title I the
Bureau of Nutrition at the Massachusetts Department of Education (the
agency responsible for the Title I commodities) was able to use the entire
$1.3 million to purchase the canned pork, canned beef, canned corn and other
"surplus removal nonbasic perishable" commodities used by soup kitchens
throughout Boston and the rest of Massachusetts. There was no intention, in
this legislation, to set up new emergency food programs based on Title I
commodities.
The second provision in the Jobs Bill that was important for community
organizations feeding the hungry was another part of Title I labelled "Food
Distribution and Emergency Shelters." The purpose of this section, according
to the legislation, was "to carry out an emergency food and shelter
program." 6 Congress appropriated a total of $100 million for this program,
to be administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Because of Congress' concern that the needs of the hungry be met as
widely and as effectively as possible, Congress chose to distribute the $100
million in two ways. FEMA would distribute the first $50 million to local
private voluntary organizations through the private voluntary sector, and the
second $50 million through the public sector.
To distribute money through the network of private voluntary
organizations, FEMA distributed $50 million to a national board composed of a
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representative from FEMA, and a representative from each of the United Way
of America, the Salvation Army, the Council of Churches, the National
Conference of Catholic Churches, the Council of Jewish Federations, and the
American Red Cross. 7 The national board would distribute its $50 million
(minus an amount up to 2% for the costs of an audit) to local boards
organized by local United Way or Red Cross chapters across the nation. Of
the $50 million allocated to the national board, the Boston local board
received $220,416.52.
According to the implementation plan published on May 3 by the national
board, the purpose of the $50 million grant ("FEMA I") was explicitly to assist
the work of local private voluntary organizations providing food and shelter
to the needy:
The intent of Congress is to alleviate the strain on local
volunteer agencies which, because of the severity and
magnitude of the economic conditions on families are unable
to keep up with the needs for food and shelter.Y
As mandated in the legislation, for these "local volunteer agencies" to be
eligible to receive FEMA I funds, the agencies "should be nonprofit, have a
voluntary board, have an accounting system, and practice nondiscrimination.
Participation in the program should be based upon a private voluntary
organization's ability to deliver emergency food and shelter to needy
individuals." 9
The implementation plan added an additional stipulation regarding the
eligibility of local agencies for receiving FEMA I funds. The plan of the
"Emergency Food and Shelter National Board Program" determined that:
In case there is a local religious or service organization or
agency with the capacity to deliver food or shelter, but which
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does not have an adequate accounting system but meets all the
other criteria, the local board may authorize funds to be
channeled through an agency which does have an adequate
accounting system and meets all the criteria.10
This option became important in Boston. Because of it, the local board was
able to provide FEMA I funds to over twenty additional organizations, using
the Permanent Charity Fund as the agency through which the local board
channeled the money.
On May 18, Daniel Daley, the Executive Director of Project Bread, wrote
a letter to the director of the United Way of Massachusetts Bay addressing
the very issue of the inability of some small organizations to have the fiscal
accountability requested in the regulations. The letter said: "Most of the
small (but I stress most important) food providing places may very well have
no audit since they really have no money or permanent paid staff.""l
Fortunately, the national board had made provisions for these relatively
informal organizations by allowing the channelling of funds through a fiscal
intermediary. This sort of flexibility recognized the particular circumstances
of community organizations, and made some allowances for them.
The FEMA I money was available for the use of local organizations
- and even small organizations - but only to the extent that those
organizations expanded their operations. According to the implementation
plan, the money was "intended for the purchase of food and provision of
shelter, to supplement and extend current available resources and not for
substitution or reimbursement for ongoing programs and services."1 2 The
funds, therefore, were not available for the costs associated with starting- up
a new program, nor were they available as a substitute for the current
funding for a given organization.
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Thus, for example, when the Project Review Committee of the Boston
local board met to review the applications from local agencies, they asserted:
The funds allocated are to be used to supplement and increase
the capacity of agencies to deliver food and shelter services
to additional people. The committee took notice of programs
already tied closely to other sources of funding such as meals
programs for the elderly. 1 3
The members of the Project Review Committee were concerned that after
exhausting the FEMA I funds, the local organizations might not be able to
maintain the level of service to which they had expanded with FEMA I funds.
The FEMA I funding did make allowances for some of the needs of local
organizations, but mostly for their direct program needs, not their
organizational needs. The amount of money available for administration was
small (up to a maximum of 2% of the total grant), and the allowable
administrative costs only included such items as publicity and utilities, but not
personnel costs. A small food pantry receiving $3400 from the FEMA I funds,
for example, could request reimbursement for only up to $68 worth of its
$600 utility bill.14
Furthermore, there was significant pressure on community organizations
from both the national board and the local board not to use even the small
amount of money that was available for administration. As stated by a
recommendation from the Project Review Committee of the Boston local
board, "Those agencies requesting administrative costs would be asked to
absorb them and to use all funds for direct services."15 These funds
provided a rare opportunity for local agencies to receive reimbursement for
some operating costs, but the pressing needs of the communities they serviced
pushed them to continue to absorb administrative expenses and put all the
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available resources into direct service delivery. Although extremely
beneficial for the local organizations' abilities to provide services to their
clientele, the FEMA I money did not provide for local organizations' own
maintenance as organizations.
The remaining $50 million appropriated through FEMA by the Jobs Bill
went directly to the states for distribution ("FEMA/state"). The purpose of
this money, according to the Emergency Food and Shelter Program Plan
published by FEMA in April 1983, was "to supplement programs of food and
shelter through voluntary organizations at the local level." And like the
FEMA I money, the FEMA/state money was intended, according to the plan,
to "alleviate the strain on local volunteer agencies." 16
FEMA distributed the allocated funds for each state (Massachusetts' share
was just under $1.3 million) to the agency designated by the Governor as
responsible for the funds. In Massachusetts, the Governor's Office of Human
Resources managed the grant, and it was administered through the
Department of Public Welfare. According to William Bartin, Policy Analyst
for the Governor's Office of Human Resources, there had "never been a
program like this." It was like a block grant for the provision of emergency
services for a chronic problem, given to the state from the federal agency
usually responsible for natural disasters.17
The actual allocation of the FEMA/state funds was the responsibility of
the Planning Committee of the Governor's Committee on the Homeless. There
were approximately ten people on this committee, including representatives
from the United Way, CAP agencies, and food and shelter advocacy groups.
The committee divided the $1.3 million into three sections: $300,000 for the
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newly-opened City of Boston Long Island Shelter, $200,000 to the new
Department of Public Welfare shelters, and the remaining $900,000 to be
divided among 24 "convener agencies" state-wide. 1 8
In Boston, one of the members of the Planning Committee requested that
Action for Boston Community Development, Inc. (ABCD) play the role of the
convener. ABCD was a logical choice in that through their network of Area
Planning Action Councils (APACs) and Neighborhood Service Centers (NSCs)
they had access to almost all the Boston neighborhoods. As the convener
agency, ABCD served as the fiscal umbrella for the FEMA/state funds in
Boston.19
Like the FEMA I money, the FEMA/state money had limitations and
restrictions placed on it. According to the implementation plan for these
funds:
States should select private nonprofit voluntary organizations
(including churches) which have an accounting system and are
nondiscriminatory. Local units of governments also may be
selected. In selecting local recipient organizations
consideration must be given to the demonstrated capability of
the organization to provide food and shelter assistance, in a
timely and efficient manner. 20
Like the FEMA I funds, this money was available only for the expansion of
existing services for existing agencies.
There were restrictions on the actual use of the money, similar to the
restrictions placed on the FEMA I funds. And although the reimbursement
level for administration this time was only 1% of the grant total, just as in
the FEMA I grant the plan limited the reimbursements for administrative costs
to publicity and operating costs. 21 Once again, personnel was not a
reimbursable expense.
- 52 -
By allowing administrative expenses in the two FEMA grants, the
legislation acknowledged that community organizations providing services need
support for their own maintenance and organizational development; but the
allocation attached to this acknowledgement was insufficient to fully meet the
needs of the organizations, and the eligible costs were too restricted.
According to Bartin in the Governor's office, however, these restrictions were
not surprising given the structure of the legislation.
By channeling the money through FEMA, Congress put hunger and
homelessness in the same category as the types of civil emergencies and
natural disasters to which FEMA usually responds. The guidelines for the
FEMA programs followed this "emergency" paradigm; they were guidelines, in
Bartin's estimation, "suitable for six to eight weeks," not suitable for the
establishment or support of long-term social programs. 22
For this reason, the deadlines under which the organizations had to
operate were extremely tight. The United Way's announcement of the Boston
FEMA I award was on May 16, and on May 20 the local board met to discuss
the allocations. The Project Review Committee determined the actual grant
awards on May 24, just one week after United Way mailed the initial
announcement. This short time frame for implementation of the grant,
according to the United Way, was "in keeping with its emergency nature."2 3
Furthermore, the FEMA national board was requiring that the local boards
return a complete plan of local implementation and expenditures within fifteen
days of receiving their award notice from the national board.
This extremely condensed time frame posed significant difficulties for
many small organizations. As Daniel Daley said in his May 18 letter to the
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United Way:
Many of the most needy places are also the smallest and least
extensively staffed; therefore, I hope the distribution
committee will make every effort to stretch the very short
.time allowance made for grant applications. Many of the
people who run these services do so on a part-time/volunteer
basis and may not even see their mail before it is too late to
apply.24
Thus for example, on a Friday afternoon at 5:00 the one half-time staff
person at the food pantry and soup kitchen of the Mission Church of St. John
the Evangelist happened, coincidentally, to be at the church when she
received a call advising her to check the mail for the week. In this mail
was a notice about the FEMA I funds, and an application that had to be
completed by the following Monday. With a lot of work over the weekend,
she was able to complete the application on time. 2 5
Not all organizations were fortunate enough to have learned about the
awards. For many of these agencies, the money channeled through the
Permanent Charity Fund to set up the Project Bread Assisted Permanent
Charity Emergency Hunger Fund enabled them to apply for and receive FEMA
I money after the May 24 deadline had passed. In this instance, the
flexibility built into the program was crucial for allowing small community
organizations to take advantage of the resources. Had there not been groups
such as Project Bread and the Hunger Hotline represented on the Project
Review Committee, the committee might have overlooked the need for this
flexibility.
One of the most consistent complaints about the FEMA I money was this
short time frame in which organizations had to act. During the 26 site visits
conducted by the United Way to the local organizations receiving FEMA I
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funds, only five organizations did not volunteer criticism about the short time
span for the award application process. 26
Small voluntary organizations must work very hard to provide services,
and most of their effort goes directly into providing services for the needy.
These organizations frequently do not have well-developed accounting
measures nor do they have formal program planning skills. To apply for a
grant requiring program expansion, many organizations would have to consider
their needs for expanded storage space, refrigeration, cooking facilities,
seating capacity, transportation, publicity, and volunteer labor. Expecting
these organizations to be able to respond overnight with detailed program
expansion and expenditure plans is unrealistic. Even though the local board
made a concerted effort to keep the process simple, determining how to
quantify their operations is difficult for informal organizations.
The lack of time to plan services, and then the very short time in which
organizations have had to expend their allotted funds (they had three months
in which to encumber their FEMA awards) has meant that local organizations
always operate on an ad hoc, as needed basis. It is hard for them to plan
on-going services, because funding (like the FEMA money) comes in short-term
clumps. They often do not know if services can be continuous, because they
do not know how continuous their funding for those services will be.
The FEMA program, as designed, was offering the short term solution
appropriate for an acute problem. The local organizations, however, were not
experiencing hunger in their communities as short term acute problems
remedied with a few months of expanded services. The problem of hunger as
faced by local organizations is a chronic problem.
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The lack of available administrative funding from FEMA funds also fit
into the "emergency" paradigm that treated the problems as short term acute
ones. The FEMA money was available for the direct "emergency" services of
food and emergency beds, but not for any capital expansion. Thus, the FEMA
programs demanded expanded services, but provided no capital to back up or
maintain the expansion. One church food pantry, for example, a FEMA
recipient, complained during their site visit that in order to provide the
expanded services as required by the legislation, they needed a freezer to
store larger quantities of food. The FEMA money, however, did not allow
the purchase of major equipment. Fortunately, the Project Bread Hunger
Hotline - once again functioning as an advocate for the organizations - had
been able to distribute emergency funds for the purchase of freezers. Even
so, the food pantry felt that the government, in setting up the FEMA
programs, did not realize "street needs" in putting explicit restrictions on
funds. 2 7
This unwillingness to fund administrative and capital costs, according to
Bartin in the Governor's office, was completely consistent with the Reagan
Administration's perception of "voluntarism." 28  Funding administrative costs,
in the government's view, would be tantamount to creating new social
services. The Reagan Administration, however, had been pushing the
voluntary sector to fill in where federal spending on social services pulled
back. The assumption was that the local agencies in the private nonprofit
and voluntary sectors would be able to absorb the expanded costs of
providing expanded services.
Even though the FEMA allocations were for the "emergency" provision of
services, Congress passed legislation in the fall of 1983 to extend this
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program. The Continuing Resolution, Public Law 98-151 and the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Public Law 98-181 together added $40 million to the
FEMA provisions in the Jobs Bill. Because the FEMA I money distributed
through the charitable boards had reached local organizations more quickly
than had the FEMA/state money (and because it was a successful example of
a private sector initiative), Congress determined that the local board of
private charitable organizations would distribute this subsequent $40 million
("FEMA II").
Once again, FEMA published an implementation plan. This plan stated
that Public Laws 98-151 and 98-181:
. provide for expenditures that will supplement emergency
food and sheltering needs for the indigent and homeless
through March 31, 1984. The intent of this supplemental
funding is not to resolve structural poverty in the nation, but
to attend to emergency needs that have arisen from the
economic problems that have struck many parts of our country
in the past year. 29
The availability of money through the FEMA programs was clearly driven
by pressing need in the country. FEMA, however, by focussing money on
direct services, met the needs of individuals receiving services, more than the
needs of organizations providing those services. Whereas the Title I program
made federal commodities available to existing group meals programs, the
FEMA allocations made actual money available - in many instances to
agencies that had never before received federal money. Unlike the Title I
program, the FEMA programs brought a new network of organizations into the
realm of federal resources.
The FEMA programs were beneficial because they provided money.
Unfortunately, however, the restrictions on the funds limited the benefits.
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For many small agencies, unrestricted money is far more useful than
restricted money, but both are more useful than actual goods. These
agencies constantly rely on unpredictable and sporadic resources. They often
receive donations to meet their immediate needs, but it is hard to plan
around or rely on these donations. For example, an agency could receive
money restricted for buying only pots and pans, and then the next day
receive a call from a restaurant willing to donate an entire set of used pots
and pans. Money given without restrictions allows agencies to adapt their
resources to their needs as they see fit. Even so, and in spite of the
problems and inadequacies with the FEMA allocations, they did make money
available to some of the smallest and poorest emergency food providers.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE SUPPLY SIDE
The third relevant provision in the Jobs Bill was Title II which provided
both commodities (as in Title I), and administrative funding (as in the FEMA
allocations). The provisions of Title II, however, unlike Title I, did not simply
increase the variety and decrease the cost of products already regularly used
by the organizations. Title II, furthermore, unlike the FEMA allocations, did
not provide money (with some restrictions) for the agencies to use for the
services most appropriate for their communities. Title II of the Jobs Bill
through the surplus dairy distribution most explicitly solidified the trend in
the Reagan Administration's approach to food policy. Whereas Title I and the
FEMA allocations were limited Congressional responses to the public demand
for emergency food, Title II firmly established an ongoing strategy for
distributing a surplus supply of agricultural commodities.
Title II of the Jobs Bill was called the "Temporary Emergency Food
Assistance Act of 1983." There were two sections of this "Act" that were
particularly relevant to community organizations. Section 202(a) stated:
. . . commodities acquired by the Commodity Credit
Corporation that are in excess of quantities needed for the
fiscal year to carry out a payment-in-kind acreage diversion
program, maintain U.S. share of world markets, and meet
international market development and food aid commitments
shall be made available by the Secretary of Agriculture . . .
without charge or credit in such fiscal year for use by eligible
recipient agencies.
Section 204(a) stated:
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There is appropriated for the period ending September 30,
1983, $50 million for the Secretary [of Agriculture] to make
available to the States for storage and distribution costs, of
which not less than $10 million shall be made available for
paying the actual costs incurred by charitable institutions, food
banks, hunger centers, soup kitchens, and similar nonprofit
organizations providing nutrition assistance to relieve situations
of emergency and distress through the provision of food to
needy persons, including low-income and unemployed persons,
provided that in no case shall such payments exceed five
percentum of the value of commodities distributed by any such
agency. 1
On April 26, the USDA published regulations governing the implementation
of Title II of the Jobs Bill. These regulations set up an entire new part of
the Code of Federal Regulations entitled "Temporary Emergency Food
Assistance Programs." The intention of this part was to "set forth the terms
and conditions under which (1) surplus food will be distributed to eligible
recipient agencies under the emergency food assistance programs and (2)
Federal funds will be provided to assist in such distribution." 2 This provision
of the Jobs Bill explicitly expanded the types of organizations eligible to
receive surplus agricultural commodities, and explicitly allowed for federal
support for the organizations distributing the commodities.
For the first time, the legislation and the regulations identified a new
class of agencies eligible to distribute commodities. The regulations
determined that organizations traditionally eligible for USDA commodities, as
well as "food banks and similar public or nonprofit institutions which
distribute commodities to needy individuals for household consumption" would
be the eligible recipient agencies able to receive the Title II surplus
commodities. 3
Unlike the provisions in the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Title II of
the Jobs Bill clearly specified the role of community organizations providing
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emergency food assistance for distributing commodities to the hungry. In
addition and most significantly, Title II of the Jobs Bill responded to
pressures from advocates for community agencies by addressing some of the
organizational needs of emergency food providers. The legislation allotted
$50 million, divided among the states according to a formula based 40% on
the number of unemployed persons in the states and 60% on the number of
households with incomes below the poverty level. The rationale for this
formula was that "Public Law 98-8 the Jobs BilW was enacted as an
emergency relief measure to address problems created by poverty and
unemployment." 4
This was the first time that Congress made money available to
"emergency feeding organizations" such as soup kitchens, food pantries and
food banks specifically to offset some of the costs associated with
distributing surplus commodities. Of the $50 million allocated through Title
II, at least $10 million (but no more than 5% of the value of the commodities
distributed) would be available to reimburse the direct costs of local
agencies. According to the USDA, "Congress intended these funds to be used
to defray costs of distribution to emergency and distress type feeding
facilities whose primary purpose is the provision of food in emergency and
distress situations to needy persons." 5 Title II would provide administrative
support money for the emergency food providers using surplus USDA
commodities in their operations. This meant that there would be
administrative support money for the mass dairy distributions, and it also
meant that soup kitchens and food pantries would have access to the surplus
agricultural products.
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The money was available specifically for storage and distribution costs.
According to the regulations, "storage and distribution costs" included "direct
costs incurred by an emergency feeding organization or by a state for
intrastate storage and transportation of any Title I or II commodity donated
for use by an emergency feeding organization." 6
It is important to realize that this money was available to organizations
exclusively in the context of their operations distributing surplus agricultural
commodities. These funds were available to support the activities of only
those organizations that used Title I and Title II commodities. The activities
of those emergency feeding organizations running food programs with money
from the FEMA allocations but which did not use USDA commodities, for
example, would not be able to receive reimbursement under Title II of the
Jobs Bill. The funding provision of Title II would meet the needs of the
organizations operating on the demand side of food policy; but it would meet
their needs only to the extent necessary for the implementation of policies
designed to distribute agricultural surplus. In this way, Title II of the Jobs
Bill continued to push current food policy from the supply side.
Even though Title II of the Jobs Bill ostensibly met some of the needs of
local organizations, it was still evident that the primary purpose of the
legislation was to support U.S. agricultural policy. In a press conference
shortly after signing the legislation into law, President Reagan said, "We're
adding to . . . the amount of those that is going to be redistributed to the
people of need . . . . But . . . we have to be sure that in doing that, we
don't just add further problems to the agricultural community by, in that
disposing, interfering with or wiping out their potential markets." 7 The
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cheese and butter could go to the needy if it would empty the warehouses,
but not at the expense of the food and agriculture industry. Just prior to
this press conference, President Reagan had stated:
Although our large surplus remains a problem, we can be
grateful that even in economic downturns, America has an
abundance of food. This bittersweet situation afforded us the
opportunity, early last year, to initiate a program to help
those hard-hit by the recession by giving away surplus cheese
and other dairy products. . . .
I personnally believe we shouldn't keep agricultural products
locked up in storage that needy people require and cannot
afford to buy. So I am asking [Agriculture) Secretary Block
to explore ways some of the other commodities in Government
warehouses can be distributed to the needy to alleviate
unusual hardship without disturbing our farmers' markets. 8
Even as the Jobs Bill expanded and prompted the distribution of
agricultural commodities, the Reagan Administration was becoming concerned
that its plan to empty the warehouses by giving away surplus food might have
glutted the market. Secretary of Agriculture Block expressed the Reagan
Administration's approach to this problem when he said: "We intend to design
this program in such a manner to prevent displacement of normal commercial
channels. We do not want these donated foods going to people who would
have been buying them anyway." 9
By the fall of 1983, the Reagan Administration's concerns about the
commercial effects of the commodities distributions took concrete form on
September 2 in the second Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Act of
1983, Public Law 98-92 (P.L. 98-92). Apart from the oxymoron of being a
second "Temporary Emergency" act, this legislation extended Title II of the
Jobs Bill, more clearly defined participation standards for local organizations,
even more firmly established the program, and made explicit specifications to
ensure that the distribution did not disturb commercial markets.
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The legislation mandated several changes that both restricted the people
who might receive the food, and placed administrative burdens on the
organizations distributing the food. The legislation required that each state
agency "determine those persons in the State that shall qualify as needy
persons eligible for such commodities." 10 For the first time, the program had
limits (albeit nonspecific limits) placed on who might be classified as "needy."
The legislation also stated that "No eligible recipient agency may receive
commodities under this Act in excess of anticipated use, based on inventory
records and controls."Il Not only were local organizations going to have to
document eligibility, but they were going to have to keep close inventory of
the commodities as well.
Whereas the Jobs Bill had allocated $50 million for some of the costs of
implementation (at least $10 million of which was for local agencies) for the
six month period from March to September 1983, P.L. 98-92 allocated $50
million for each of two fiscal years. The same amount of money had to go
twice as far. The Jobs Bill had initiated a limited ackowledgement of the
implementation needs of local organizations, but. P.L. 98-92 constricted that
acknowledgement.
Also included in P.L. 98-92 was a very explicit push to move the surplus
commodities out of federal storage as quickly as possible. Section 203B of
the Act, part (a), required that "The Secretary shall, as expeditiously as
possible, provide the commodities made available under this Act in such
quantities as can be used without waste to State agencies. . . ."
Furthermore, in part (b), "State agencies receiving commodities under this Act
shall, as expeditiously as possible, distribute such commodities, in the
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quantities requested (to the extent practicable), to eligible recipient agencies
within their respective States." 1 2
Even though the legislation was pushing through a continuous supply of
the surplus commodities, a final key provision in P.L. 98-92 responded to the
dairy industry concerns that free surplus cheese displaced retail cheese sales
in the market.1 3 The law demanded that the Secretary of Agriculture "shall
not make commodities available for donation in any quantity or manner that
the Secretary, in the Secretary's discretion, determines may substitute for the
same or any other agricultural produce that would otherwise be purchased in
the market."1 4 Just as the concerns and needs of the agricultural industry
were critical at the program's inception in 1981, the concerns and needs of
the agricultural industry were critical at the program's institutionalization in
1983.
During the debates on P.L. 98-92, the Senate Committee of Agriculture,
Nutrition and Forestry filed a report explaining the "need to expand domestic
commodity distribution." This report crystallized the current federal
approach to food policy as exemplified by Title II of the Jobs Bill and by
P.L. 98-92:
The cornerstone of the program is to use existing surpluses as
supplemental food assistance for needy persons during the
current economically distressed period and for other nutrition
programs historically assisted through commodity donations.
At the same time, the Committee emphasizes that this is a
temporary program to utilize only those commodities that are
in temporary surplus. It should not be the policy of the
Federal Government to encourage the acquisition of surpluses
that will dampen farm prices or to establish an expectation
that such surpluses will be available in future years for
distribution to organizations, though worthwhile, that are
defined as eligible recipient agencies under the bill. . . .
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The Committee commends the voluntary and local public
commitment that has been so important to the success of the
special dairy product distribution program, and wants to
provide for further expansion of these efforts with existing
surplus commodities, including dairy. 1 5
Title II of the Jobs Bill and Public Law 98-92 were laws based on a
desire to keep down the cost of government. The USDA gave federally-
owned surplus food to people too poor to otherwise buy the foods, thereby
not diminishing retail food sales. The local organizations distributing the
food received minimal funding for their efforts, thereby encouraging
voluntarism. Participating organizations received funding based on a
percentage of food distributed, thereby encouraging the use of larger
quantities of the commodities. The funding organizations received went to
distribution of the commodities and not to organizational maintenance, thereby
avoiding the institutionalization of a new social service. And finally, the
legislation left a significant amount of discretion at the state level, thereby
fostering the "New Federalism."
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PART THREE: THE LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION
CHAPTER SIX
THE EMERGENCY FOOD NETWORK
The different titles of the Jobs Bill had a variety of impacts on
community organizations. The legislation allowed the expansion of existing
programs for some organizations, and created new programs for other
organizations. To understand the impacts that the legislation had on the
services provided to the hungry, it is essential to understand the nature of
the organizations providing those services.
There are two main categories of organizations most affected by the
emergency food and commodities provisions in the Jobs Bill. Social service or
Community Action Program (CAP) agencies were the organizations in Boston
that felt the effects of Title II of the Jobs Bill through its impact on the
surplus dairy distributions. Food pantries felt the impacts of Title II through
the availability of surplus commodities for their existing operations, and food
pantries received allocations of money through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). The FEMA money affected soup kitchens as
well, as did the availability of commodities through Title I and the increment
of funding for those commodities available through Title II. The extent of
the impacts on these different organizations has depended upon the nature of
the organizations, and the relationship of the provisions of the Jobs Bill to
the services the organizations already provide.
The CAP agencies are multi-purpose social service agencies scattered
throughout the different neighborhoods of Boston. Some of them are fiscally
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autonomous agencies directed by a community board, others operate simply as
field offices of a parent organization. In Boston, the CAP agencies function
under the rubric of Action for Boston Community Development, Inc. (ABCD),
Boston's anti-poverty agency.
These agencies provide a wide variety of services, particularly services
aimed at fostering community self-reliance. These services include
employment placement and training programs, day care programs, youth
employment and activities programs, community gardening programs, and a
variety of education programs. In some instances, the CAP agencies also
provide direct assistance to the poor. The ABCD agencies administer the
fuel assistance program and more recently, many of them now offer food and
material aid to individuals and families in need.
For many of these organizations, their entry into the network of
emergency food providers was only to meet a growing need in their
communities. As one agency director put it, by 1982 they started to receive
requests for food, and were the only agency in the neighborhood with the
"response capability" to meet the demand. In this way, they were "elected by
default" to answer the need.1 Providing emergency food became an adjunct
to their other operations.
The increased diversity of their services has placed a real strain on the
capacity of many of these agencies. As one local staff member explained,
"We're down to one person per task area now." 2 Recent decreased funding
for the Community Services Administration included in the Reagan
Administration's budget cuts forced ABCD to significantly decrease staff in
the local agencies. At the same time that they were operating with a
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reduced staff, the demand for their services was increasing. The same
programmatic cuts that decreased the staff of these agencies decreased the
level of a wide variety of social programs that had provided services for the
poor. These agencies serving the poor were being asked to do more with
less.
Receiving relatively less compensation for relatively more work
exacerbated already difficult working conditions for these organizations.
Typically, these agencies are located in run-down buildings with insufficient
furnishings and inadequately paid (and sometimes inadequately trained) staff.
There is never enough money (and now there was even less) to meet all the
needs of the communities right outside their doors and windows. The phones
are always ringing -either with constituents making impossible requests, or
with supervisors making seemingly impossible demands. The staff usually must
document every activity and every service, leaving "paper trails" wherever
they go. Never mind that documenting the lives of the poor - people whose
lives are incredibly complicated as it is - is often easier demanded than
implemented.
With the passage of the Jobs Bill, these organizations became responsible
for another program, the surplus dairy distributions. Although some of the
agencies had initiated emergency food programs on a small scale, none had
experience with large scale food distribution. The impact of the Jobs Bill
was that it established a new realm of activities for already over-burdened
and under-compensated agencies.
The Jobs Bill also had impacts on other community organizations, but
these are different sorts of organizations and the programmatic impacts were
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different as well. The other main category of organizations affected by the
legislation was the "emergency feeding organizations" - the food pantries and
the soup. kitchens.
A food pantry typically provides a three-day supply of groceries
- usually nonperishable - to individuals or families without food. Pantries
vary widely in their size and organization; often they are nothing more than
a few shelves of donated food in the corner of a church or synagogue, but
sometimes they are independent programs with a paid staffperson and an
operating budget.
Many organizations for many years have had food pantries. Historically,
organizations like the churches or the Salvation Army had small amounts of
food they could provide to individuals or families in need. As Tim Morris,
Director of the Family Services Bureau at Boston's Salvation Army explained,
the Salvation Army's food pantry had "always been here." 3
Most frequently, these pantries were very informal, and stocked entirely
with donated food. The St. Joseph's Parish Church in Roxbury, for example,
started its food pantry in the end of 1979. This very small pantry was
stocked solely from charitable donations. On an as-needed basis the pastor
would determine whether an individual was "needy" or not. 4 In many other
churches, social service agencies, and health centers, the staff would respond
as best they could to the occasional request for food.
Demand for services at these food pantries has been steadily increasing.
A survey of eleven Boston food pantries showed that the number of people
served between January 1983 and January 1984 more than doubled. 5 Since
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January of 1980, the Salvation Army in Boston has seen an increase of 253%
in the number of people they are serving. In 1980 they served 3860 cases,
and in 1983 they served 10,513.6 In 1982 the Jamaica Plain APAC started
receiving referrals for emergency food from other neighborhood agencies.
They went from serving approximately five families a month to serving an
average of over 90 families a month. 7 The St. Joseph's Parish Church food
pantry which started as a very small and informal pantry, now runs a weekly
program, serving over 100 families. 8  Four or five years ago, people
requesting food from the Salvation Army's Family Service Bureau were
primarily the victims of fire, theft or other one-time acute emergencies.
Now, over 70% of the people requesting food are the victims of "chronic"
emergencies - people whose income cannot last long enough to keep food on
the table for an entire month. 9 Although these are isolated examples, there
is a shared trend among all emergency food providers in Boston: the demand
for their services has increased sharply over the past few years.
In spite of increasing demand, and in spite of the recent establishment of
new food pantries, they are often small and isolated from each other. In
many cases, neighboring food pantries do not even know of each other's
existence. A directory of emergency food pantries put together in December
1982 by the Jamaica Plain Area Planning Action Council (APAC) and the
Boston Food Bank listed 62 food pantries known to them in the Greater
Boston area.1 0 During that same time, a survey conducted by the Harvard
School of Public Health monitored services at 172 food pantries in Greater
Boston. 1 1 The discrepancy in numbers between the two surveys is indicative
of the nature of these organizations: they rarely publicize their activities,
and they are often just a small part of a larger organization's activities.
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Many of the people running food pantries will not publicize their pantries,
specifically because they are concerned that they would be overwhelmed by
the demand. When asked about his agency's food pantry, one agency director
first denied he had one, and then said he had a "quiet" food pantry stocked
with donations from a suburban church. 1 2 Another staff member at an
emergency food center mentioned that they had a food pantry, but even
though demand was increasing, their own limited energy as an all-volunteer
organization curtailed the amount of food they could provide.13
Like food pantries, soup kitchens have sprung up because of a felt need
in the community. Particularly for people who are homeless and would
therefore have no means to prepare or store groceries from a food pantry,
the soup kitchens have often meant the difference between starvation and
survival.
Many soup kitchens started from informal "door-bell ministeries" where
someone would run to the kitchen to make a sandwich for a person knocking
at the door. In one church-run Boston soup kitchen, as the number of people
knocking on the door started to increase rapidly, the church staff tired of
running up and down the stairs to throw together sandwiches with whatever
food they had available. They decided to set up an organized soup and
sandwich line. They now serve soup and sandwiches every day to
approximately thirty people. 1 4
Soup kitchens may vary widely, depending upon their clientele. The
guests at some soup kitchens are senior citizens, who enjoy the opportunity to
share a hot meal with other people. Still other soup kitchens serve primarily
"street people," many of whom have no homes and some of whom have
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recently been deinstitutionalized. Soup kitchens, however, are now feeding
more than the elderly and the alcoholics and "street people" usually
associated with feeding centers. Major Charles Williams of the Salvation
Army recently testified before the Citizens' Commission on Hunger in New
England that the soup kitchens at the Salvation Army are now feeding more
children and parents than single people and alcoholics.15
The increasing number of families at soup kitchens is a new phenomenon.
These are the "new poor" - the newly unemployed families and the families
on welfare whose budgets cannot provide enough for them to feed themselves.
Having small children at a soup kitchen creates a peculiar situation for soup
kitchen workers. The staff at the soup kitchens are committed to providing
a safe and secure enclave for their guests, but they worry about the
potential danger to children of being in such environments. Very often, the
"street people" who come to the soup kitchens have a history of emotional
problems. Many times, they carry weapons. The workers at soup kitchens
are not only service providers, but they often must perform as peace-keepers
as well.
There is a certain amount of danger inherent in working in any of these
organizations. They are often located in poor sections of the city, and
workers at the evening meal or volunteers going home after evening meetings
often run the real risk of being mugged. People who come for meals at soup
kitchens or come for food from food pantries are often desperate, frustrated,
and angry. They are often humiliated for having had to ask for help, to
have had to publicly acknowledge that they are in need of something as basic
as food. Several workers at emergency food centers in Boston have reported
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being assaulted; one was held up at knifepoint while in the church where she
operates a soup kitchen.16
Because of increased demand for their services and because of the
urgency of the demand, the food pantries and soup kitchens have had to tap
as many of the available resources they can find to acquire the food that
they need. To provide emergency food packages for twenty two-person
households in a week (three meals a day for three days), for example, a
pantry might need:
20 pounds of ground beef
20 cans of beef
20 macaroni dinners
80 cans of vegetables
20 bags of noodles
40 cans of fruit
20 cans of fruit juice
20 packages of oatmeal
20 bags of dried beans
80 cans of soup
20 loaves of bread
20 packages of cheese
40 envelopes of dried milk
20 jars of peanut butter17
As a guide for people setting up emergency food centers points out:
It is important that the best foods possible are in that
package, because while we might say 'this is just for an
emergency few days' it is very often the case that these
people have already been living on potatoes for a week or
cornflakes for three days. Many poor people have diet-related
health problems: high blood pressure, vitamin deficiencies,
diabetes, obesity, low infant birth weight, and so on - and
have been ordered by their doctors to eat food they cannot
afford.18
Because the needs of their clients are so urgent, the pantries and soup
kitchens have needed to find some way to maintain a consistent supply of
food.
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Food pantries usually stock their shelves with food they purchase at a
food bank or with food they obtain from donations or from solicitations at
local stores and restaurants. Recently, many food pantries in Boston have
also received USDA-provided surplus commodities.
Soup kitchens also rely heavily on donated food, and also rely on the
church, synagogue, and community groups who often make a regular
commitment to donate food and prepare and serve a meal once a week or
once a month. The donations are helpful for the soup kitchen, and the
opportunity to prepare a meal helps the donors understand and feel connected
to the people they are serving. Soup kitchens have historically been eligible
for USDA commodities, and the Jobs Bill made even more commodities
available. Soup kitchens also rely heavily on the Boston Food Bank.
Most emergency food centers take advantage of the Boston Food Bank to
"purchase" food. Like all food banks, the Boston Food Bank serves as a
clearinghouse for industry-donated salvage and surplus food. Individuals may
not use the Food Bank; it is open only to soup kitchens, food pantries, and
other organizations providing emergency food services.
At the end of 1983, there were approximately 350 agencies in the
Greater Boston area that were members of the Boston Food Bank, and there
were more agencies waiting to become members. 19 As the demand for use of
the Food Bank has increased, so has the volume of food that the Food Bank
has distributed. In 1982 the Food Bank distributed 763,512 pounds of food.
In 1983, they distributed over twice that amount. 2 0
The Food Bank acquires food in a variety of ways. The Food Bank picks
up truckloads of salvage food from supermarket reclamation centers. These
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are foods that for a variety of reasons are not saleable - the cans are
dented, the wrappers are torn, the boxes are crushed. The Food Bank then
sorts the food, throwing away anything that violates health and safety
standards (such as a very badly dented can or an opened box). Another
major source of food is large-scale donations of food from producers and
wholesalers. These donations are foods that do not meet the industry's
criteria for retail sale: the labels may be misprinted, the food color balance
may be slightly off.
Industries that donate to the Food Bank and the retail markets that
provide salvage and surplus foods get the benefits of positive publicity, and
they get certain tax breaks for their donations. These types of donations to
the Food Bank improved when Massachusetts passed legislation ("Good
Samaritan" legislation) in May 1983, limiting the liability of donors to
emergency food centers if the donation was made in good faith. 21
Over the past year, the resources available to the Food Bank and
ultimately to emergency food centers have expanded significantly: in the
month of January 1983, the Food Bank received 176,081 pounds of food from
a variety of sources (mostly industry donations); in December of that year,
they received 475,327 pounds. 22
To become a member of the Food Bank, organizations must be
incorporated as non-profit and tax-exempt, they must complete a Food Bank
application, and they must vouch that they distribute their food for free. 2 3
Once a member, a food center "shops" at the Food Bank, selecting from
whatever foods are available on that day. The variety of foods available is
often unpredictable, and the quantities usually limited. The food, however, is
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inexpensive to the pantries and soup kitchens. For every pound of food
taken from the Food Bank, the agencies contribute 124t "shared maintenance."
The "contribution" is the primary operating revenue of the Food Bank, and
pays the costs (such as personnel and transportation) of keeping the Food
Bank open. The more food the Food Bank distributes, the quicker it can
become self-sustaining. This is important to the staff of the Food Bank; they
do not want to find themselves competing against their member agencies for
dwindling public or private monies. 24
There are problems for some organizations, particularly the smaller ones,
in using the Food Bank to stock their pantries. Because of the unreliability
of the Food Bank's food supply, the St. Joseph's Parish food pantry has found
it difficult to count on the Food Bank for the foods they need. Donations
from the food industry are often packaged in institutional-sized containers,
making them inappropriate for distribution to individual households.
According to Maureen Prochaska, Pastoral Associate at St. Joseph's, the focus
of the Food Bank is more on "tonnage," and less on meeting the needs of
small pantries trying to put together appropriate emergency food packages for
individuals and families. 25 Another emergency food provider, the Mission
Church of St. John the Evangelist, mentioned that their primary food source
must come from somewhere that has the facilities to deliver the food because
transportation is a problem for them. 2 6
For agencies that do not have vehicles, that do not have someone to
send to the Food Bank, do not have tax-exempt status or cannot fill out the
application, the Food Bank is not a helpful resource. For most agencies,
however, the Food Bank has been a critical source of food.
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Most of these organizations have exhausted all the resources for food
they feel that they have access to, and have exhausted other resources as
well. A staff person at one center ackowledged that they have not applied
for many grants simply because that is not where their skills lie. 2 7 Another
person at a different center holds down two jobs while running a growing
food pantry, a newly-established soup line, and a weekly dinner. She does
what she can to get as many resources as possible, but she can only do so
much as one person. "When do I do the laundry?" she asks. 28 According to
testimony in October 1983 at the public hearing sponsored by the Citizen's
Commission on Hunger in New England, there are "pastors from churches in
Roxbury and Dorchester [who have] become, in effect, part-time fund-
raisers, simply to get enough money to keep up with the more acute needs in
their. congregations., 2 9
In spite of the fact that they are often overworked, when resources are
available, they take what they can get. Their freezers are usually donated,
their cabinets, vehicles, copying machines, desks and file cabinets usually are
donated. When money is available for a specific purpose, they usually take
it, even if it is not what they need most. When they have an opportunity to
expand, they usually do so because they are dedicated to their work and do
not want to turn down resources for their communities, even though they are
already pushed beyond reasonable limits.
Most emergency food providers rely heavily on volunteers, partly because
there is limited funding available to pay for personnel. Volunteer
organizations have numerous advantages as well as disadvantages, as cited by
a report published by the U.S. General Accounting Office in 1983:
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Volunteers were considered to be a valuable resource of most
emergency food centers. It was recognized that many of these
workers have a high sense of dedication and commitment to
helping those less fortunate than themselves. We were told at
one food center, for example, that volunteers make the best
workers because they believe in what they are doing.
Officials at a number of other food centers told us, however,
of problems they have experienced with volunteers who tend to
be less than reliable, work irregular hours, do not possess
needed skills, and whose enthusiasm wanes over time. We
were further told at a number of the organizations we visited
that the need is great for additional paid staffers who are (1)
on the job each day to coordinate and direct activities and (2)
generally more skillful than volunteers in soliciting donations
of food and other resources. 30
A report by Senator Edward Kennedy on the increase in hunger in
America described the dilemma of the neighborhood organization relying on
volunteers, trying to provide emergency food to a hungry community:
The food distribution effort is primarily a voluntary
undertaking to meet a need that suddenly emerged; it is not a
permanent system and there is reason to believe that it is
strained to the breaking point. Volunteers are overworked,
the hungry are underfed; and providers are fearful that they
cannot sustain even present efforts if demand does not
decline. 3 1
The people who run the emergency centers often take on these
responsibilities because they are genuinely concerned about fighting hunger.
The people who run these pantries often work long, hard hours for little or
no pay, and do so willingly. They are often masters at "making do" with
nothing, and making very little go a long way. For many of these people,
working in these organizations is part of their commitment to live among
those "on the edge" of the social geography, 3 2 where they struggle for social
change with a battle cry of "Bread and Justice."
They write and speak about peace and justice, hunger and charity, and
about struggle and the empowerment of the poor. Their newsletters and
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their publications are often filled with quotations from the Bible and from
other spiritual writings. They are deeply committed to the justness of their
activities, and feel that they are providing the quality of services that social
policy will not. One emergency food center worker noted they did not
choose to publicize their activities or participate in governmental programs
because this way they could provide a level of "personal" service they
otherwise could not. 33 As a long-time advocate for the poor recently said,
"we are like bright and colorful weeds in a stone jungle." 3 4
Many of these workers, often for political and moral reasons, earn little
more money than the people for whom they provide services. Some of them
have middle class backgrounds and they have chosen to stand side-by-side and
identify with the disenfranchised. A handbook providing guidelines for people
setting up emergency food centers has a set of group exercises to sensitize
people to the lives of the people they are assisting. The group exercises
include trying to live for three days on a typical emergency food package or
trying to survive on a Food Stamp budget (434 per person per meal). 3 5
These types of exercises are a way for the workers to feel connected to
each other and to feel that their work, although poorly compensated, is
valuable. At the same time, however, the people working in these centers
often stop for a moment to acknowledge that their work and their
organizations are not the answer to hunger and poverty, and that the causes
of hunger are deeply rooted in social inequity.
The centers are also often staffed with volunteers from the neighborhood.
Sometimes these are people who, at some in their lives, have themselves
relied on the centers for assistance. For some it is a chance to help
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neighbors in need. The volunteers often have few formal skills in
management or program coordination, but they offer energy and they offer
knowledge of and concern for the community.
Given the nature of these organizations and the personal commitment of
the people who work there, as demand for their services has increased, they
have felt obligated to try to do what they can to meet that demand. The
agenda for a meeting of volunteers running a growing church-based food
program identified sixteen areas of responsiblity for which they needed
volunteers. And this was an already well-organized group of six or seven
volunteers. 3 6
Emergency feeding centers are organizations "on the margin" because
they choose to stand among and identify with people marginalized by society.
They are organizations that operate without the usual framework of eligibility
standards, accountability measures and monitoring procedures typical of other
social service providers.
These are the organizations - small, informal, voluntary, hardworking
emergency feeding organizations "on the margin", and over-burdened and
bitter social service agencies - onto which the recent federal legislation
overlaid a series of policies providing resources and federally-owned
agricultural surplus commodities. For some of these organizations, the
resources have been a boon. For some of these organizations, the resources
have not been beneficial. The difference in impact has been directly related
to the attention that the legislation paid to the needs of the organizations
implementing the policies.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES
The passage of the Jobs Bill and the Temporary Emergency Food and
Assistance Act of 1983 (P.L. 98-92) had a significant impact on the surplus
dairy distributions. The program quickly expanded, the implementation
became more regular, and the distributions became more established as an
ongoing food program. At the same time that local implementation was
becoming more routine, the regulations governing the program were becoming
stricter - limiting the supply of available commodities, and restricting the
eligibility of recipients.
In Boston, the most important change in the dairy distribution program
was that the responsibility for the distributions transferred from the
Community Schools, to Action for Boston Community Development, Inc.
(ABCD), Boston's anti-poverty agency. After one year of being responsible
for the program, the Community Schools chose not to continue participating.
According to one of the people responsible for the distribution at ABCD,
even with administrative funds forthcoming from Title II in the Jobs Bill, the
schools did not want to be part of the program, asserting that they were "in
the education business, not the food distribution business."1
The decision of the Community Schools not to participate meant that the
Bureau of Nutrition at the Department of Education needed to find another
Boston distribution network. The ABCD network of Area Planning Action
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Councils (APACs) and the Neighborhood Service Centers (NSCs) was a logical
choice. The local ABCD organizations effectively covered the entire city
(with the exception of Hyde Park and West Roxbury), the APACs and NSCs
would be able to mobilize a contingent of community volunteers to assist in
the distributions, and the APACs and NSCs were experienced in the delivery
of social services to the low-income clientele that were eligible for the
cheese and butter.
In an informal contract with the Department of Education, ABCD agreed
to provide distribution of surplus agricultural commodities, starting in the fall
(November) of 1983. Since P.L. 98-92 stipulated that the program had
funding through November 1985, ABCD would be responsible for the first
distribution in November 1983, and then distributions every three months
thereafter. 2 The State had been pushing local agencies to distribute more
frequently than once every three months (since the State itself is required to
distribute the commodities "as expeditiously as possible"), but the agencies
have unequivocably refused. There would be a nine-month hiatus between the
last Community Schools-sponsored distribution in February and the first
ABCD-sponsored distribution in November, but this interim would allow ABCD
time to set up an on-going system for surplus food distribution.
Using a portion of the 5% of the value of the commodities distributed
allocated for "storage and distribution costs," ABCD hired two full-time staff
people to coordinate the program. ABCD had to convince the Department of
Education that this was reimbursable as a direct cost of the distributions.
The responsibilities of these staff people have included setting up an ordering
schedule, ensuring timely delivery of adequate amounts of the foods, and
setting up a system to ensure that recipients of the food are indeed "needy."
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Having centralized and supportive administration at ABCD to help with
the program logistics has been extremely beneficial for the local
organizations. Even with this support, however, the worst part of the
program for the agencies has been the actual implementation of the surplus
food distributions.
Local agency employees throughout Boston have described the distribution
days in different ways: "ugly," "horrendous," "chaotic," "obscene." Local
organizations shut down their entire activities for the whole day - perhaps
leaving one person to answer the phone. Everyone else becomes what one
staff member called an "involuntary volunteer." In addition, a battery of
over a dozen community volunteers filter in throughout the day. (Some
volunteers receive $4.00 an hour from the ABCD general program funds,
others work purely as volunteers.)
Usually around three hours before a distribution opens at a typical
distribution site, a line of people starts to form. The people who come early
are usually the most elderly, the most infirm, those who cannot stand up long
enough to wait in a line outside. Meanwhile, volunteers haul the cases of
food (in November, cheese and butter; in March, cheese, butter and dry milk)
off the delivery trucks. Hundreds of cases of cheese, butter and milk fill
the distribution halls. The volunteers rip open the cases, and stack the food
along the tables. Five pounds of cheese, two pounds of butter and four
pounds of dry milk for households of four or under. Twice that amount for
a larger household.
The lines of people grow longer. By the time the distributions begin,
people have been waiting for hours. Their hands are too cold and stiff to
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sign the forms. (The weather was cold during the distribution weeks in
November and March.) Some people are concerned that they are too frail to
carry home their allotment of food. People press around the tables, anxious
and agitated.
Recordkeeping systems and accountability systems go awry - no one's
eligibility is questioned; when the line gets too long people are let in without
signing the registration forms. The inventory system goes awry - the plan
for monitoring how much is actually distributed may never get implemented.
People unpacking cartons break some boxes of milk. When no one is looking
some people slip a few extra sticks of butter or blocks of cheese into their
bags.
The volunteers work extremely hard, unloading and unpacking thousands
of pounds of food. The people receiving food are angry for having had to
wait in line, for having had to sign so many forms. The hall is littered with
empty boxes. The floor is wet from the cardboard that wrapped the frozen
butter. One person tries to go through the line twice, but is recognized by
a staff person. Maybe another person does go twice through the line
unrecognized.
Many of the problems of implementation are inherent in the program
itself, and policies made at the central office of ABCD for implementation by
the APACs and NSCs can provide little assistance. The central office, for
example, set up specific and standardized procedures for verifying eligibility.
ABCD had decided that eligibility would mean Boston residency and low
income according to current fuel assistance guidelines ($14,850 for a family
of four). Any Boston resident who receives welfare, Medicaid, Veteran's
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Benefits, Fuel Assistance, Supplemental Security Income, Head Start, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, Food Stamps, the Special Supplemental
Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children, subsidized general housing,
unemployment or General Relief would automatically be eligible. Although not
publicized as such, ABCD also allows people to "lself-declare" their income
without documentation by signing an affidavit asserting that their income falls
within the guidelines. During the November distribution, a "verifier" would
go down the line of people waiting for food to inform people of what
constituted eligibility. This would speed up the process of eligibility
determination and prevent people who were not eligible from remaining in
line.
The central office of ABCD also takes the main responsibility for
monitoring publicity about the program. 3 Publicity is an aspect of the
program that is difficult to regulate, but absolutely crucial to successful
implementation. Two factors affecting the amount of appropriate publicity
operate simultaneously. First of all, according to the administrators at
ABCD, it is important that ABCD spread program information equitably
throughout all neighborhoods of Boston. It is very important that the
publicity be widespread, and that a large number of people come to the
distribution. Since ABCD receives an administrative reimbursement of up to
5% of the value of the commodities distributed, there is a strong incentive to
distribute as much as possible. Publicity, therefore, needs to be extensive.
Similarly, local agency directors are concerned that their agencies might
overestimate the amount of food they will need and have cheese and butter
left over at the end of a distribution. According to Richard Murphy, the
- 92 -
director of ABCD's surplus food distribution, only two of the APACs or NSCs
in the city have refrigeration facilities, and the agencies without
refrigeration would have to find a means to transport undistributed food to
Community Schools or emergency food centers that could store it. 4 For this
reason, it is important that there be sufficient publicity to ensure that
enough people come to receive the food.
At the same time, one of the greatest fears of both the central office of
ABCD and the local agencies is that they underestimate the amount of food
they will need, and on the day of a distribution they run out of cheese or
butter. If more people show up than are expected, the local agency might
run out of food. Program participants would become very angry, having
waited in line for hours to receive their cheese and butter, and then not
receiving anything. Given a simple concern for public safety, it is important
that there not be too much publicity in order that too many people do not
attend the distribution.
One of the major difficulties for the neighborhood organizations is this
problem of trying to estimate how many people will show up for a distribution
and how much food to order. The only guidelines the central ABCD office
could offer were very general. The Community Schools had left very
incomplete and sketchy written records of the amounts of food each
neighborhood had received. The best ABCD could do to estimate
participation was to try to estimate the relationship of the Community
School's neighborhoods to the catchment areas of the APACs and NSCs.
During the first ABCD distribution in November, the South End Neighborhood
Action Program (SNAP) ran out of food an hour before the distribution was
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over. Fortunately, there were upcoming distributions in other neighborhoods,
and SNAP sent the people without cheese and butter to the other
distributions. 5 When the food ran out at a different agency's distribution in
November, fights broke out and several people were arrested. 6
ABCD made some significant changes between the November distribution
and the March distribution that it hoped would alleviate some of the problems
they had experienced in November. The major change it made was instituting
a pre-registration system. Under this pre-registration system, approximately
two weeks before a distribution, the central office of ABCD and the APACs
and NSCs advertise the program, advising people to go to their neighborhood
ABCD offices to pre-register. At the local agency, staff members complete a
registration form for each eligible household. Once pre-registered, a person
receives a uniquely-numbered eligibility card good for the entire year. Then,
at the distribution the person would bring the card, and have it punched
indicating that he or she had received food for that month. A person's card
would be valid only in the neighborhood where issued.
In instituting the pre-registration system, ABCD was responding to
several pressures simultaneously. First, there was a strong implication in P.L.
98-92 that eligibility standards were going to be getting stricter and
intimations that USDA would soon publish regulations requiring more extensive
documentation of participation. In December 1983, the USDA had published
regulations for P.L. 98-92 stating, "The Department plans to publish additional
provisions that will increase the effectiveness of the assistance . . . and -will
strengthen the accountability and monitoring requirements." 7 By initiating
standards at this point requiring stricter monitoring of program participation,
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ABCD would have a model system already in place when the USDA actually
did impose tougher regulations.
ABCD was also responding to offical concern that there was some fraud
in the program. Under the previous system, a person could go from
distribution to distribution, collecting commodities at each one. A pre-
registration system would allow people only to receive commodities in their
own neighborhood, and it would theoretically guarantee that they receive
commodities only once.
The pre-registration process would also eliminate long lines of people
waiting in the cold for their food. By having people declare and document
their eligibility before the actual distribution, it would take less time for
each person to actually receive their food. On distribution day, people would
only have to sign for their food, not prove their eligibility.
Another advantage of the pre-registration is that it would facilitate the
local agencies' estimation of the number of people coming to the distribution.
The agencies would have the benefit of their pre-registration figures upon
which to base how much food to order.
ABCD had hoped that the pre-registration process would simplify the
distributions considerably. '"With a program that distributes commodities to
over 60,000 low-income households over a very short time period, a pre-
registration process is essential,' [ABCD Executive Director Robert Coardj
said. 'Obtaining an eligibility card good for an entire year will reduce
waiting time and make the process easier for all involved."' 8 Pre-registered
individuals would be able to go through an "express line" at the distribution,
and would not have to wait as long as people who had not pre-registered.
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The implementation of the process, however, has not been without
complications; this has made estimating participation even more difficult. In
Boston's South End, for example, there was pre-registration the two weeks
preceding the distribution in mid-March. The pre-registration was well
publicized because the agency (SNAP) had hired two community outreach
workers for two weeks out of their 5% allocation for administration. The
agency director, Pat Cusick, decided that having people work on publicity
would be more beneficial for the agency than having them work exclusively
on pre-registration. According to Cusick, he would be turning the
distribution to his agency's advantage by using the opportunity to spread
information throughout the neighborhood about the existence of SNAP. 9 Most
agencies, however, used their two-week supplemental staff people to work
solely on pre-registering people.
As it turned out, the pre-registration this first time did not work quite
as well as anticipated. According to Cusick, the publicity about pre-
registration had been intentionally ambiguous, and people were confused.
Since the idea was to encourage pre-registration, the publicity could not
realistically advertise pre-registration, and also say that people who did not
pre-register should come to the distribution anyway. Similarly, after pre-
registration closed a few days before the distribution, SNAP could not
advertise the distribution for those who had not pre-registered: this would
imply that pre-registration was pointless. 1 0
The net result of this was that on the day of the distribution, many
eligible people who had not pre-registered stayed away, thinking they could
not get the commodities without having first registered. At the distribution
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in the South End, because most of the actual participants had pre-registered,
the line for people who had pre-registered was much longer than the line for
those who had not. This meant that there was no "express line" for those
who had taken the extra time and made the extra effort to pre-register.
They had to wait just as long outside in the cold as did those who did not
pre-register.
Because of the ambiguity in the publicity, there were far fewer people
than anticipated. ABCD had delivered commodities to approximately 58,000
households in November, 1l and expected somewhat more than that number in
March. SNAP had expected close to 4000 people in March, but at the end of
the distribution day, almost half of the commodities they had ordered were
left undistributed. It was up to Cusick to find some way to dispose of the
leftover food. Again, the community organization was caught by policies
made without understanding their ramifications in implementation. Cusick
could not simply dump the commodities at a housing project (whose residents
would automatically be eligible for the food), because this would have negated
all of the energy put into the distribution by subverting ABCD's entire pre-
registration process. Another problem was that because of the push to
distribute the commodities as quickly as possible, all the emergency shelters
in the area had already received their allotments of the products. As Cusick
put it, "every refrigerator in the South End was already filled with the
stuff."1 2
The pre-registration process was supposed to facilitate participation, but
as one agency employee said, it is "making poor people jump through hoops
for services." The pre-registration process is also supposed to make the
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program run more smoothly at the agency level, but one agency employee
described it as a real "strain on us." It does not prevent program "abuse,"
because the system is easily subverted. It does not improve accountability,
because strict accountability is impossible for the community agencies. As
Mary Thomson, the Executive Director of the Jamaica Plain APAC claimed,
USDA demands total accountability from local agencies, and they do the best
they can. But frankly, she said, they cannot possibly be accountable. 1 3
The worst part of the program for the agencies, however, has not been
the pre-registration. Most agencies have found ways to integrate the pre-
registration into their existing program structure. (There actually may be a
side benefit of pre-registration in that it brings people into the agencies.)
The worst part of the program for the agencies is not the paperwork - most
social service and CAP agencies are familiar with paperwork. As with many
programs, in the process of implementation local agencies find ways to
simplify the process and take shortcuts on the paperwork. The bureaucracy
of the program is not the real complaint; instead, the complaints are more
fundamental. The agencies' complaints emanate from the fact that the
program was not designed with either the needs of the recipients nor the
needs of the implementing agencies in mind.
As ABCD program director Richard Murphy said, the community
organizations do not like the distributions because the staff is already
overworked, having suffered budgetary cuts while having to maintain the same
service level. To the local agencies, the surplus distribution is another
example of being required to run one more program without additonal
compensation.
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Murphy also mentioned that the lack of lead time for planning has made
program implementation difficult; the November distribution coincided with
the fuel assistance program (one of ABCD's biggest services), and the March
distribution coincided with the beginning of ABCD's summer youth employment
program (ABCD's second big service). 1 4 As Thomson in Jamaica Plain said,
the program places unrealistic demands on local time and resources.15
The community organizations do not like the distributions because they
are expensive to the organizations. There is minimal allowance for
implementation. In one neighborhood, the agency director had to coordinate
the distribution with the fifteen neighborhood agencies serving the elderly.
Through the cooperation of those agencies' social workers, each home-bound
elderly person in the neighborhood was pre-registered for the surplus food
distribution. The City's department of Elder Affairs had helped with the
registration, but not with the food delivery. This left the responsibility of
getting a delivery system to the agency director. There are over 200 home-
bound elderly in this community, and it took four or five vans borrowed from
different agencies to deliver the food to all of them. This ad hoc delivery
system worked this one time, but the agency director is sure that the system
"will break down." The agencies donating the vans cannot afford to give up
their own staff time and to give up their vans every three months to deliver
surplus foods.1 6 Although transportation costs would theoretically be an
allowable expense reimbursable under the 5% administrative allocation in Title
II of the Jobs Bill, the costs of printing the pre-registration forms and
eligibility cards necessary for an accountability system and the costs of hiring
outreach and pre-registration workers essential to move the commodities as
quickly as possible, used up the available administrative money. Costs such as
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the extra transportation expenses have to be absorbed by the local
organizations.
Complaints in other areas have mirrored the complaints in Boston. A
community organization in Maine's Oxford County made the following cost
estimates for their commodities distribution program: they used a total of
175 volunteers between April 1982 and April 1983, and served 10,940 families;
it cost the agency $12,000 to run the distribution, for which they received
$2000 in reimbursement. According to this agency:
The fact of the matter is that with 175 volunteers there are
costs involved. Agency staff must organize and supervise,
there is extensive travel of both staff and volunteers and
there are program demands: planning, organizing, and
implementing; postage and mail handling costs to notify clients;
and more. Ten thousand dollars ($10,000) of local funds have
been expended to provide this commodity program over the
past year.17
Christopher Robstock of the Pittsburgh Community Food Bank described
his agency's concerns about the commodities distributions in a report by
Senator Kennedy on hunger in America: "Even if the program were operated
efficiently and equitably . . . the types and amounts of commodities available
are insignificant in light of the nutritional needs of our citizens. . . . their
value is cancelled out by the costs involved in making them available at the
local level." 1 8
The agencies that participate in the distribution believe that their time
could be better spent in other, more productive activities. Oxford County
Community Services in South Paris, Maine noted:
As an agency we are willing to participate yet we have
difficulty with expending local funds on a project which has
given a meager total of 20 or so pounds of surplus food per
needy family. . . . In addition, the funds which we expend are
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funds which would otherwise be used in areas of far greater
potential such as health and dental screening, cottage industry
development and other activities which focus on helping the
low-income and elderly help themselves out of poverty.19
In Maryland, the director of the Maryland Food Bank recently explained
why the Food Bank was discontinuing the program. "'We'd like to be able to
cooperate in distributing the cheese and butter, [bul3 these punitive
regulations make it impossible for low budget voluntary organizations to work
with federal programs. . . . It is impossible to do the monitoring necessary
for the federal audit." 2 0
Unlike the Maryland Food Bank, the Boston agencies do not have the
independent option of discontinuing participation in the program. They too,
however, recognize that the reimbursement rate does not cover the costs of
the program. They cannot even use program funds, for example, for food for
volunteers on the day of the distribution. 2 1 Both Pat Cusick in the South
End and Mary Thomson in Jamaica Plain averred that the time their
respective agencies spend on pre-registering recipients and actually
distributing food could be spent in other ways that would be more useful to
the agencies in the long run. Thomson especially noted that since the pre-
registration began she has had to sacrifice the kinds of inter-agency
cooperation and communication that are critical to long-run organizational
development. 2 2
Most of all, however, the agencies do not like the distributions because
they do not see any real long-run benefits for their communities. It is not
always clear that the people who could most benefit from the surplus cheese,
butter and nonfat dry milk are the ones who receive it. According to
- 101 -
requirements published by the Department of Education, even pre-registered
people have to sign for their food - providing name, address and social
security number. Some people do not have social security numbers, some
people do not have permanent addresses, some people cannot read or write
their own name. These people may very well be those most in need of food,
the people most hungry. Most agencies will not turn them away at a
distribution, but demanding documentation becomes a burden to the
organization and an insult to the people from whom it is asked, and may
deter participation by the most needy.
People who work in the community agencies know their neighborhoods
well; they often live there themselves, and the agencies's clients are often
their families, friends, and neighbors. The staff people see people they know
and care about stand in line for over an hour, waiting for less than $15.00
worth of food. Even though participants have obviously decided that the
program is worth their time, it bothers people working at the distribution
that the program is so "degrading" and "demoralizing."
Furthermore, many people do not see any long-run nutritional benefits for
the hungry and malnourished. In fact, nutrition advocates have been
concerned that the surplus commodities may not be healthy. For Southeast
Asian refugees, who are among the neediest people in the state, dairy
products are not customary in the diet, and some refugees may not be
adapted physiologically to digest lactose, the natural sugar present in milk
products.
There are other more general nutritional problems as well. An article in
the Maine Times in August, 1983 voiced the concerns of numerous people
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when it noted that processed cheese and butter are not healthful nutrition
supplements for most people. The high cholesterol and saturated animal fat is
a problem for the elderly and for the overweight. The sodium content of
American processed cheese is extremely high - a danger to people with high
blood pressure. 2 3
The recipients of the commodities decide to participate simply because
they are are poor and hungry. (One man who has no address is asked if he
has documentation of his income. He empties his pockets on the table to
reveal a few coins, a paper clip, a key, a cigarette stub. "This is all my
income," he pleads. When he receives his cheese he remarks to another man,
"I won't be hungry tonight.") Jo-Ann Eccher, Coordinator of Project Bread's
Hunger Hotline, asks whether five pounds of cheese four times a year is
really the way to feed the hungry. 24
The surplus distributions are not effective in meeting the demands of the
poor because that goal was never predominant when the Reagan
Administration designed the program. The program's primary goal is to
decrease an excess supply of certain foods, and only secondarily to provide
that food to the hungry. As the program matured Congress tacked on some
of the accouterments (eligibility and monitoring requirements) of the sorts of
programs that define the limits on programs that actually are established to
answer a true popular demand. In this case, the community organizations
responsible for carrying through the implementation felt the pressure at both
ends: the pressure from above to distribute food "as expeditiously as
possible," and the pressure from below to provide food in a humane fashion to
hungry and poor communities. In this case, the "supply side" needs and
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"demand side" needs of the policy are inconsistent, and the burden of the
inconsistency falls on the community organizations.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD PANTRIES
The mass distribution of the surplus food was not the only program that
developed out of Title II of the Jobs Bill and the amendments in Public Law
98-92. The other mechanism for distributing Title II commodities has been
through emergency food pantries. Whereas the mass distribution of Title II
commodities has not been able to have a significant impact on meeting
emergency food needs, the food pantries have played an important role. At
the same time, the availability of Title H foods has been crucial in the
operations of the pantries.
Recent federal legislation had an impact on the food pantries' operations
in two ways. First, the money allocated through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA I, FEMA/state, FEMA II) helped food pantries
throughout Boston expand the services they provide. Second, Title II of the
Jobs Bill made available a small variety of federal commodities for the food
pantries' use.
When the FEMA I money became available in August 1983, for example,
the Jamaica Plain APAC food pantry expanded from serving 198 individuals in
August to serving 302 individuals in September.1 The APAC had initially
intended to spend $1000 of their $2400 allocation on providing emergency
shelter, but the needs of the food pantry demanded that they spend the
entire allocation on food and on shelves to store the food. According to
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their estimates, by early September they had spent close to $650, and had
provided over 3000 meals with the FEMA I funds. 2
Through the receipt of the FEMA I funds, the St. Joseph's Parish food
pantry was able to expand operations from providing seven pounds of food a
week for 52 people to providing thirteen pounds of food a week for 75
people. St. Joseph's was luckier than many pantries in that they were able to
expand their food program into a fully-equipped kitchen that had been idle at
the church. They spent their $2400 from FEMA I in just 21 months. In one
month they had spent almost $900, providing more than an estimated 10,000
meals (100 families per week x 3.6 people per family x 3 meals per person
per day x 3 days' worth of food). 3
For many agencies, the FEMA monies simply allowed them to continue or
improve their current operations. As one agency director put it, "we couldn't
live without" the FEMA money. 4 The Family Services Bureau at the Salvation
Army spent $13,000 of their $20,000 FEMA I grant on food - providing
better quality food packages to their clients. For them, the FEMA money
meant that they could set up an account with local wholesalers, in order to
increase the protein allocation in their emergency food baskets. 5
Particularly for the smaller agencies, the "expansion" of services as
required by the regulations would be impossible. For many of the
organizations, the federal money meant simple operational survival. As stated
by John King of the United Way in a letter to agencies implementing the
FEMA program:
Sentiment was expressed that most shelters and feeding/pantry
programs are 'flat out' already. This brings into question the
reality of requiring programs to expand services where there
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is a facility and/or personnel limitation built into the award.
Also it should be noted that some programs were able to
improve their menus nutritionally as a result of these funds. 6
The FEMA/state money, because of the timing, allowed many of the
organizations to continue the "expanded" level of services initiated with
FEMA I money. As Hogar Hispano, a Jamaica Plain-based shelter and feeding
center explained in their application for FEMA/state funds, the FEMA I money
they received would cover their needs only through September, and they were
asking for FEMA/state money to last through the end of the year. 7
Many agencies that had received FEMA I money could not apply for
FEMA/state funds because it would have been very difficult for them to
spend more money so quickly. As Tim Morris at the Salvation Army said, his
food pantry did not apply for the money because it "would have been too
much." 8
Even though agencies are desperate for whatever resources there are, it
is hard for some of them to spend the money (or even encumber it) in a
short period of time. A $500 FEMA/state grant.to one food pantry
represented an amount equal to half of their entire cash income for the
previous six months. The $2000 from FEMA I and the $2000 from
FEMA/state for another small center represented fully one-third of their
year's projected income. 9 They need the money, but they also need time in
which to spend it.
Fortunately, the Boston Food Bank facilitated spending the FEMA money
for many organizations. Member agencies were allowed to set up accounts at
the Food Bank with the FEMA money upon which the agencies could draw as
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they "bought" food at the Food Bank. The arrangement with the Food Bank
was particularly helpful for the FEMA/state money which was available only
as reimbursement and not as cash up front. For small organizations with no
cash flow, it is often impossible to operate on a reimbursement basis. As a
letter from one food pantry said, they would "be hesitant to administer a
second FEMA grant unless up front monies were provided." 1 0
The problems with the FEMA II grants were similar, yet further
exacerbated by the timing of the FEMA II money. The local board announced
the award December 22, 1983 and local agencies had until January 5, 1984 to
return applications. The pressure on local organizations was even greater
this time, because the Christmas season is always a time of high activity and
high demand for services from emergency food providers.
In spite of some of the drawbacks of the FEMA program, the food
pantries appreciated the money, and quickly put it to good use. The timing
of the awards was good for most agencies in that the money came when their
other sources of funding were running out. The local board administering the
FEMA money had worked very hard to keep the paperwork to a minimum, and
the majority of agencies were able to fill out the required forms. 1 1 On the
whole, in spite of the restrictions on how the food pantries could spend their
FEMA funds (especially the restriction that they could not spend the money
on personnel), the contribution to food pantries from the FEMA allocations of
the Jobs Bill was significant. FEMA required no new programs, and did not
require that organizations handle commodities or other resources that were
not part of their present operations. For most agencies, the FEMA money
gave them a much-appreciated opportunity to try to better meet the demand
they face in their communities.
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The other major impact of the Jobs Bill on food pantries was the new
availability of federal commodities. Since the passage of the Jobs Bill, a
small variety of surplus price-support agricultural products have been
available for distribution to needy individuals. These commodities have
included American processed cheese, butter, nonfat dry milk, all-purpose
flour, cornmeal, rice, honey, and most recently, Cheddar cheese. The Title H
commodities are available for household consumption either through mass
public distribution (as in the surplus dairy distributions), or they are available
to needy individuals through emergency food pantries.
In Massachusetts, all of the commodities have been available to food
pantries, but only a few have been available for mass public distribution.
According to Joanne Morrissey at the Department of Education, the policy at
the Bureau of Nutrition is to allow mass public distribution of only those
commodities stockpiled in sufficient quantities to distribute to everyone. All
other commodities are available to emergency food pantries through the food
banks. For example, nonfat dry milk is a Title II commodity that has been
available to emergency food pantries since the summer of 1983. By March
1984 there was a sufficient quantity to distribute it state-wide in a mass
distribution. For that reason, the ABCD surplus dairy distribution in
November did not include milk, but the March distribution did.1 2 Because of
this set-up, the Title II commodities have played an important role in
providing a consistent supply of food for many food pantries.
The Department of Education needed to find an effective means for
distributing the commodities to the food pantries, to ensure that the
commodities would be available on demand. The obvious distribution point
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was the Food Bank. The Boston Food Bank had originally refused to
participate in the mass public distributions of commodities because they
believed that the program's costs significantly exceeded its benefits.
However, when the Jobs Bill allocated money for expenses associated with
storage and distribution of the Title II commodities, the Food Bank decided
that they would be willing to serve as a warehouse for the commodities, for
their membership's - the food pantries' - benefit.
The Department of Education arranged for the Food Bank to draw the
commodities out of the state's warehouses on demand by the food pantries. 1 3
The pantries let the Food Bank know ahead of time that they are coming to
get USDA commodities, and the Food Bank arranges to have an adequate
supply on hand. Whereas the pantries have a limit on the amount of food
they may "purchase" at the Food Bank at any one time, the USDA
commodities do not count against that limit. 1 4
These commodities are then available free of charge to the food pantries,
with the Department of Education (and eventually the USDA) paying the 12$
per pound "shared maintenance." Serving as a clearinghouse for these
commodities actually costs the Food Bank very little. Unlike the foods
obtained from supermarket salvage, the USDA commodities require no sorting,
and they require minimal handling. And since the Food Bank receives the
commodities in amounts they know they will distribute to the pantries, there
are minimal costs associated with holding the commodities.
Unlike their other donations, however, the USDA Title II commodities
require extensive recordkeeping. In Massachusetts, the Bureau of Nutrition at
the Department of Education has assumed that role - removing most of the
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"headaches" associated with distributing the commodities from the Food
Bank.1 5 The role of the Food Bank is simply to keep a running inventory of
the commodities, and notify the Department of Education of the amounts
distributed. Recently, the Food Bank received a donation of a personal
computer, and has computerized its inventory system.
Although the paperwork in handling the commodities is minimal for the
Food Bank, the paperwork required by agencies wishing to use the federal
commodities is significant, and has been prohibitive for some agencies. To
register with the Department of Education as a food pantry eligible to
receive Title II commodities, the agency must complete an application
agreeing, among other things:
Records to document the receipt, disposal and inventory of
commodities you receive under such Agreement are maintained.
Complete financial records documenting actual storage and
handling costs incurred in providing donated commodities
received under this agreement to needy persons will be
maintained.16
In other words, community organizations must completely document each
pound of federally-owned food, from its receipt at the Food Bank through its
distribution in a package of emergency food for a needy individual. And at
the point of distribution to households, according to the agreement signed by
the participating food pantries, among other things the pantry must:
Maintain a log of recipients and food distributed by name,
address, signature, date, and indication of need. . . .
Maintain records to document the receipt, disposal and
inventory of commodities received under this program and
submit reports covering distribution operations that may be
required by the State Distributing Agency. Records must be
maintained for a period of three years or until turned over to
the State Distributing Agency.
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Allow representatives of the State Distributing Agency and the
United States Department of Agriculture to inspect foods and
review or audit records required by this Agreement at any
reasonable time.17
The pantry must document the name, address, and social security number
of each recipient, and the actual amount of commodities given to the
individual. For most food pantries, this level of documentation has been
quite burdensome. One small pantry, much as they would have appreciated
the food, could not participate in the Title II program. The recordkeeping
and the paperwork were way beyond their capabilities with a severely limited
staff. Furthermore, they serve primarily "street people," many of whom have
histories of emotional disabilities, and have criminal records, and they felt
that it would be physically dangerous to ask their clients personal information
about who they are and their "indication of need." 18
Several other food pantries that do participate have found ways to
minimize the burden of the paperwork. Some pantries have chosen to
estimate their inventory rather than record it precisely, others have chosen
to estimate the amounts distributed so that it matches the inventory. Most
agencies that rely on volunteers have found that the recordkeeping is mostly
estimation anyway, as the volunteers find the precise documentation
requirement confusing.
In addition to the logistical problem of maintaining documentation, other
agencies have chosen not to participate as a Title II food pantry because they
objected philosophically to the documentation requirements - particularly the
requirement for the social security numbers of all recipients.19 These
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agencies are concerned that these regulations compromise their role as
advocates for their clients.
In spite of the problems, however, these foods have been essential for
the functioning of many of Boston's food pantries. In January 1984 alone,
food pantries took 49,349 pounds of USDA Title II commodities from the
Boston Food Bank, 40,752 going to Boston food pantries. In December 1983
food pantries took 70,708 pounds, 27,656 going to Boston food pantries.
Between October 1983 and January 1984, USDA commodities represented over
one-quarter (by weight) of all food distributed by the Food Bank. 2 0
The Food Bank distributes to many organizations that are not pantries,
and there are many pantries that do not distribute Title II commodities. It is
possible, therefore, that up to one-half of the emergency food provided by
those pantries that take Title II commodities consists of the federally-owned
surplus foods. The implication, therefore, is that without these commodities
these pantries would have to contract their services significantly. Because of
the pressures of increasing demand, and because of the moral commitment of
the staff to meet the demand to the best of their capabilities, these pantries
have had to rely more and more on the free USDA-provided food.
The Title II commodities are useful to the pantries because they are
integrated into their normal operations. Food pantries are organizations that,
because they are set up to distribute food, can adequately use the
commodities. Assuming they have the bookkeeping capabilities, these
organizations have to make few modifications in their normal food distribution
activities. The food pantries pick up the commodities when they do their
"shopping" at the Food Bank, and they integrate the commodities into their
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normal food package (although some agencies have found that commodities
such as cornmeal and flour have limited use for a population unaccustomed to
doing its own baking2 l and pantries without refrigerators or freezers cannot
make use of the perishable items). Most important to the agencies, however,
is that the commodities are free.
One of the advantages of distributing commodities through the food
pantries is that the pantries have been able to regulate the flow of
commodities into their operations. This is where having an agency that
operates as a service provider for the needs of community organizations -
the Boston Food Bank - is so important. Because the Food Bank operates as
a distributing point for the commodities, the food pantries need only take as
many of the surplus foods as they know they can readily use.
The commodities, then, are a significant opportunity for food pantries,
but they also are an obligation. With the availability of the free federal
foods comes the requirements of extensive recordkeeping, monitoring, and
accountability. For an agency to be able to take advantage of this new
resource, they must be an agency equipped to handle an inventory system and
a client documentation system. With the commodities, they may have more
food available, but they will have to devote more time to administrative
tasks. Without the commodities, they lose out on free food, but they can
give clients what they want, no questions asked. For most pantries, they
recognize that there is a direct trade-off.
It might seem that the food pantries could be an effective means for the
federal government to dispose of its surplus commodities, while at the same
time providing a significant and useful resource for emergency feeding
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organizations. The volume of commodities distributed through pantries,
however, has been minimal compared to the amounts distributed in the mass
public distributions. In six months, Boston food pantries distributed 174,546
pounds of Title II commodities. In the one week mass distribution of surplus
butter, cheese and dry milk during March, ABCD distributed three and one-
half times as much food: 626,730 pounds. 22
Even though the volume of commodities distributed by the food pantries
is nowhere near as large as the volume distributed in the mass distributions,
the distribution of the commodities through the food pantries is much more
effective in combatting hunger (at least for some individuals) than is their
mass distribution once every three months. Through the food pantries, the
Title II commodities become a benefit to local organizations and a useful
mechanism to meet an urgent demand.
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CHAPTER NINE
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUP KITCHENS
Just as the Jobs Bill had a dual impact on food pantries, the importance
of the Jobs Bill on the operations of soup kitchens was also two-fold. It
made available (at no direct cost to the organization) the variety of Title I
"nonbasic perishable" commodities, and it made funding available through the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) allocations. In addition, Title
II of the Jobs Bill provided a small increment of money to pay for the
distribution of the Title I commodities.
The USDA made the Title I commodities available only between the
passage of the Jobs Bill in March, 1983 and the title's expiration in
September. During this time, soup kitchens and other group meals programs
were able to take advantage of a wider variety of food at a lower cost.
Unlike the other emergency feeding provisions in the Jobs Bill (the FEMA
allocations and Title II), Congress did not renew the provisions of Title I
regarding the "Distribution of Agricultural Commodities"; these provisions
expired on September 30. Nevertheless, because the Department of Education
received delivery of the commodities to their own warehouses through
September, their actual availability to local soup kitchens extended into 1984.
To be eligible for Title I commodities, an organization would have to
provide prepared food in a group setting.1 These two characteristics
distinguished the organizations eligible for Title I commodities from the
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organizations eligible for Title II commodities: Title I commodities are not
available packaged for individual consumption, and the commodities are not
for household use.
Like any other program designed to meet an existing demand, the Title I
commodities are available only in limited quantities. The state receives a
limited allotment, based on the amounts of food as purchased by the USDA. 2
The eligible organizations in turn each receive a limited allotment, based on
the number of people for whom they provide meals. In each agency's
application to receive Title I commodities, the agency must estimate the
number of people served per month. The soup kitchens receive an order form
for the commodities, and guidelines for the allotment of those commodities
per person served per month. Organizations may order more than their
allotment, assuming they can use the commodities "without waste." 3 Even so,
the supply of the commodities is clearly limited by the total allotment
received by Massachusetts ($1.3 million worth of institutional-sized containers
of prunes, canned corn, canned beef, canned pork, applesauce, sweet potatoes,
vegetarian beans, egg mix, canned poultry, peaches, and grapefruit juice). 4
The variety of the USDA commodities available to soup kitchens through
the Jobs Bill has been helpful in their operations. Two years ago, for
example, under the Food Distribution Program for charitable organizations
soup kitchens received only dairy products, flour, pasta, peanut butter, and
oils. 5 Now, the soup kitchens can base entire meals (protein foods,
vegetables, and desserts) around the USDA commodities.
The funding for the commodities under Title II of the Jobs Bill has been
helpful for many soup kitchens, especially the smallest ones. Prior to these
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funds for "storage and distribution," soup kitchens receiving USDA
commodities had to pay a service charge for the food - anywhere from
2-10% of the value of the commodities ordered. For the larger and better-
endowed organizations such as the Salvation Army, the subsidy on the service
charge did not make a significant difference in their food budget. 6 For the
smaller organizations, however, every penny of the organizations' expenses
that the subsidy saved was extremely helpful in stretching limited food
d ollar s. 7
As of August 1983, there were eighteen organizations in Boston officially
receiving Title I commodities. 8 Some of the smallest organizations, however,
the ones that have the most limited resources, were not able to take
advantage of the availability of Title I foods. As with all federal programs,
the Title I program requires a measure of accountability from the soup
kitchens. The application for eligibility requires that the organization be
incorporated as a tax-exempt nonprofit organization. For the smallest and
most informal organizations that do not have the resources - or choose not
- to incorporate, this requirement has prohibited their formal involvement
and has effectively denied them access to the commodities.
Some of these small groups, however, have managed to circumvent this
requirement by making an arrangement with a formally-registered Title I soup
kitchen. The Title I recipient orders enough of the commodities for both
groups. In this way, the eligible organization is able to act as a conduit for
other organizations that, although they serve eligible populations, do not have
the organizational structure to take advantage of all available resources.
This type of arrangement does, however, place a burden on the recipient
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agency. Each agency receiving Title I foods must provide its own
transportation to the state warehouses to pick up the food. As one
organization starts to order for another, the amount of food to be picked up
at one time becomes quite substantial.
Unlike other federal programs, the recordkeeping requirements for Title I
commodities are not complicated, although they can be confusing. As the
coordinator of a soup kitchen at a church said, government programs and the
paperwork involved are not designed with "programs like ours in mind." The
forms she received asked her for the number of "patients" served by her
agency, and the "per patient costs." She noted that it required some
"creativity" on her part to adapt the forms for her own use. 9
Because there are several commodities donation programs occurring
simultaneously, some of the soup kitchens are never quite sure which program
their food comes from. 1 0 Since the different programs carry different
service charges on the commodities (2% for senior citizens' meals, 8% for
normal charitable institutions, and none on Title I), the soup kitchens are
most likely to order the foods from the order form that has the smallest
charge. As one person said, "we can never find out what's going on."11
In addition to the Title I commodities, many soup kitchens benefitted
from the FEMA allocations in the Jobs Bill. Like the food pantries, the
FEMA money benefitted the soup kitchens by allowing them to expand their
meal services. Also like the food pantries, however, the soup kitchens were
concerned that they would not be able to maintain the expanded service level
once the FEMA funds were exhausted.
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The concern about maintaining an expanded level of services was even
more dramatic for the soup kitchens than it was for the food pantries. The
soup kitchens were providing regular meals to (in many cases) a regular
clientele. As the manager of one of Boston's larger soup kitchens said,
"People are getting used to coming here and eating. . . . How do you just
close the door?" 1 2
There are some agencies that chose not to participate in the FEMA
programs for that reason: they simply did not want to raise a level of
expectation and then be forced to pull back. Some agencies simply could not
"expand" their services as required by the legislation. According to a staff
member at Haley House, one of the oldest soup kitchens in Boston (18 years),
an all-volunteer organization like theirs is working as hard as they possibly
can to maintain the same level of service that they currently provide. They
have no space or labor to spare; at this point they certainly cannot
expand. 13
The Title I commodities and the FEMA money met important needs for
many soup kitchens, but they did not always meet the most pressing needs.
As one person said, although money is always a concern, money for food is
not the biggest concern. When necessary, they have always been able to get
money for food from donations, and food from the Food Bank is extremely
inexpensive. Free commodities from Title I are helpful, and the money from
FEMA is useful for paying for small equipment. However, what they really
need is money for administrative time (that is, staff to keep up with the
paperwork and to supervise the volunteers) and money for capital costs (large
equipment and repairs).1 4 The Jobs Bill and its extentions, intentionally
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limited in this, had no provisions for the needs crucial to the maintenance
and survival of the community organizations. The Jobs Bill funding tended to
view the organizations as mere service providers, rather than as whole
organizations with needs for organizational survival and maintenance.
The impact of the Jobs Bill on soup kitchens was limited, and it was
limited for two reasons. First, soup kitchens had a history of participating in
federal commodities programs, and the Jobs Bill continued that involvement.
Title I made no qualitative difference in the types of services provided to
their clientele. The availability of the money distributed through FEMA
encouraged expanded services, but not to the detriment or at the expense of
other activities. And second, unlike the food pantries or the social service
agencies responsible for distributing surplus commodities to households, the
soup kitchens did not get involved in the new program designed to empty
federal warehouses.
Unlike the food pantries and agencies distributing surplus dairy, the soup
kitchens were affected only by the provisions of the Jobs Bill that Congress
had added to respond to the increasing awareness about hunger in America
and the increased demand for food by the needy. The soup kitchens were
able to continue to function as they had, operating exclusively for the benefit
of their clients within the demand side of food policy.
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PART FOUR: CONCLUSION
CHAPTER TEN
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NETWORK
The recent availability of surplus agricultural commodities to feed the
hungry has had significant impacts on many community organizations. To
understand the implications of this for the operations of these organizations,
it is important to understand the nature of the implementation of the
commodities programs at the community level, and the nature of the
organizations responsible for the implementation.
(In analyzing the impacts of the commodities programs, it is most useful
to look primarily at the surplus dairy distributions and the Title II programs.
The Title I program was altogether less significant. The Title I program has
been short-lived - the only emergency food provision in the Jobs Bill that
Congress did not extend beyond its initial expiration date in the end of
September 1983. Title I has been helpful for soup kitchens, but nevertheless
has not significantly altered their existing patterns of commodities utilization.
Compared to the other programs (the mass distributions and Title II), the
impact of Title I on community organizations has been minimal.)
The commodities made available through the surplus dairy distributions
beginning in 1981, and made available through the Jobs Bill and its
extensions, have been part of a particular federal response to hunger in
America. On the one hand, the federal government in 1981 and 1982 was
decreasing federal support to a wide variety of food and nutrition programs.
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On the other hand, the federal government was also allowing the release of
surplus agricultural commodities locked in federal storage. The decreased
support for federal social service programs had generated an increased
demand at the community level for services for the poor and the hungry.
The Reagan Administration was responding to this demand by distributing
surplus food and by trying to expand the voluntary feeding centers. Although
the federal government was ostensibly filling the gaps left by reductions in
the human services budget, it was filling those gaps inadequately and even
inappropriately.
It is useful to compare the implementation of the FEMA programs with
the implementation of the commodities programs. Whereas their similarities
exemplify the current federal response to domestic hunger, their differences
point out the particular role that agricultural commodities are playing in the
operations of community organizations.
Both programs have been episodic in their implementation, but the
commodities programs - although episodic - have, over time, become
institutionalized. Congress designed the FEMA allocations under a very
explicit "emergency" paradigm. The short term sporadic nature of the
allocations has mitigated against the ability of community organizations to
plan for long range organizational strategies or even to plan the delivery of
continuous services to their communities.
The mass distributions of commodities have also been characterized by
sporadic implementation. Particularly in the first two years, the availability
of food was erratic. The distributions involve episodes of intense activity,
followed by a lull. Over time, however, the distributions have become more
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routine and institutionalized - yet institutionalized as episodic activity.
Providing regular and routine services is easier for community organizations
than providing sporadic services, but it has not been the timing of the
implementation that the federal government has made more routine. Instead,
the institutionalization of the program has made more of a burden for
community organizations rather than less; the documentation, monitoring, and
accountability standards have become stricter, imposing extensive
administrative requirements on the community organizations.
Another similarity between the FEMA programs and the commodities
distributions is that both programs have neglected to provide sufficient
resources for administrative or organizational support. The allowances for
administrative reimbursement are insufficient, and they are restricted in such
a way that the community organizations must absorb much of the financial
impact of program implementation, particularly the costs associated with
personnel. The FEMA allocations have provided only a very small increment
for administration, and only administrative costs connected to the expansion
of direct services. This restriction promotes increased services, enforcing
the requirement that community organizations take on a relatively larger role
as providers of social services.
The administrative costs for the commodities distributions have been even
more inadequate than the costs associated with the FEMA programs. The
commodities program allows reimbursement for only those costs directly
related to the actual distribution of the surplus food. The FEMA programs
have provided money for organizations to use in the context of their existing
operations, whereas the commodities distributions impose a new program on
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the organizations, and then do not provide enough money to support the costs
of running the program. Although making available commodities for the use
of food pantries, unlike the mass distributions, does not create a new
program as such, it does, however, create a whole new realm of bookkeeping
and accountability standards to which the pantries must adhere. Although
distributing food is not new to pantries, detailed eligibility and inventory
requirements are.
The FEMA programs and the commodities distributions are also similar in
that there is an implicit assumption in both of them that the voluntary sector
and private charitable contributions will absorb those parts of the programs
that are under-funded or over-burdened. Congress designed the FEMA
allocations to promote activities by voluntary organizations. The money has
pushed these existing organizations to expand their current activities, thereby
expanding the role of the voluntary sector in providing services.
The commodities distributions as well rely on volunteers to actually
distribute the food. In Boston, the agencies responsible for the mass
distributions are not voluntary organizations. Nevertheless, agency staff all
become "involuntary volunteers" on distribution days.
The distribution of commodities through food pantries has also had strong
implications for the Reagan Administration's emphasis on "voluntarism."
Distributing surplus agricultural commodities has incorporated these
organizations into the amalgam of U.S. agricultural policy. By supporting
existing price policies that generate agricultural surpluses, and then by using
emergency feeding organizations to "dispose" of those surpluses, Congress has
effectively linked food pantries and other community organizations into U.S.
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agricultural policy. As long as the federal government needs a politically
acceptable method of disposing of surplus, the emergency feeding
organizations will play a significant role.
Both the FEMA programs and the commodities programs take a short
term and episodic approach to hunger, push short run service delivery at the
expense of organizational needs, and emphasize the role of informal voluntary
organizations to provide social services. These characteristics are consistent
with the Reagan Administration's official view of hunger in America as a
short term acute and temporary social anomaly. This approach to hunger puts
an exceptional burden on community organizations: they confront and
recognize hunger in their communities daily as a long term chronic structural
problem.
The community organizations are left with trying to cure a deeply rooted
ailment with a superficial remedy. The commodities programs and the FEMA
programs have insisted that community organizations tend to the needs of
their clients, but not to their own needs for organizational development. The
programs have demanded that some very small and informal voluntary
organizations attempt to fill the wide gaps left by a decreased commitment to
social services. The programs have forced community organizations to try
and solve long term problems with short term solutions. The programs have
placed the community organizations between the push of a surplus agricultural
supply and the pull of the demands of a needy community.
A major difference, however, between the FEMA programs and the
commodities programs is the connection that the commodities programs have
with U.S. agricultural policy. The commodities programs developed out of the
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push of excess agricultural supply, whereas the FEMA allocations were a
limited response to the pull of the demands of the needy. Because the
commodities programs grew from the federal level response to a federal level
problem, the programs have not significantly incorporated concerns for
demands at the community level.
The federal government dumped the commodities on the states, and the
states, in turn, dumped the commodities on community organizations. The
community organizations were faced with enormous quantities of food on one
hand, and enormous numbers of hungry people on the other. Unfortunately,
the two are not necessarily complementary. Although surplus commodities
might keep some people from going hungry for a few days, the commodities
program does nothing to identify, combat, or solve the real causes of hunger.
Many of the people working for community organizations, however,
recognize that hunger derives from poverty, and poverty derives from the
unequal distribution of resources. Because of this, the community
organizations operate within the context of the demand in their community.
They are organizations predisposed to identify with the problems of their
constituents, rather than with the storage problems of the Reagan
Administration.
The contradiction of running a supply driven program through
organizations committed to the issues on the demand side of food policy
means that community organizations will never be able to distribute all of the
surplus commodities, at low cost to the government, with total accountability.
The organizations do not have the capacity to move a large volume of
commodities; as all organizations do, they incur significant costs in running
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their activities; they do not have the bureaucratic capability of maintaining
thorough accountability at the organizational level; and they do not have the
inclination to demand total accountability from their clients. The
organizations take the commodities because they want to provide services for
their communities, not because they want to participate in a program serving
U.S. agricultural interests. The organizations play the game because they
feel they should, but they do not want to play by the same rules that the
federal government wants them to use.
It is unreasonable and unrealistic to presume that informal voluntary
organizations can fill the needs left by drastic human services budget cuts.
It is also unreasonable and unrealistic to presume that these same
organizations have the capacity or the will to maintain the sophisticated level
of bureaucratic accountability that goes along with receiving federal
resources. Even as these community organizations learn to become more
accountable, and even as groups like the Project Bread Hunger Hotline and
the Boston Food Bank rise to meet the service needs of emergency food
providers, the level of service they can provide will never meet the level of
service that the federal government could.
One of the dangers of this new federal response to hunger is that this
federal involvement in the operations of the emergency food network may be
at the expense of federal support for the major social programs. The more
effort that Congress and the federal government put into the commodities
distributions to institutionalize them, and the greater their attempt to
legitimize the informal feeding network, the less attention they are likely to
pay to the already-established (but suffering) feeding programs such as Food
Stamps and the child nutrition programs.
- 134 -
This new federal response to hunger may also be at the expense of
support for other programs more beneficial to the community. Assistance for
urban gardening programs, farmers' markets, cottage industry development,
and food cooperatives would be valuable initiatives working towards
community food self-reliance, and working counter to the "give-away" focus of
the Reagan Administration's current approach. Commodities distributions and
the food programs within the emergency food network do nothing to combat
the root causes of hunger. As an article published in England critiquing the
Reagan Administration's food policies declared:
Making the handout machinery more efficient won't make it
more effective. Hunger, as we all know, derives from
poverty, which is a symptom of some basic imbalance in the
distribution of resources within a society. Giveaways do
nothing to alter that imbalance; indeed in a good many cases
they exacerbate it, as any development worker worth his salt
will tell you.'
The Reagan Administration has used commodities distributions as a very
public way of appearing to respond to concerns about decreased federal
support for social programs and about increased incidence of hunger. The
federal government has settled upon the emergency food network as the
instrument for these distributions, and community organizations have borne the
brunt of the complexity of the implementation of these programs. These are
organizations that have little capability to withstand the ever-increasing
demand for their services, and have little experience to help them adjust to
their ever-widening role as the provider of services.
The federal government has paid inadequate attention to the needs of
community organizations, and inadequate attention to realities of program
implementation. In struggling to meet the needs of their clients, community
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organizations have pushed themselves organizationally beyond their capacity.
The federal government has demanded service from these organizations to fill
a void left by the government's own negligence. And the service response
demanded from the emergency feeding network has been way beyond what the
network can and should provide.
Not only are these organizations limited logistically in their ability to
provide services, but they are also fundamentally limited by virtue of the
type of organizations they are. Once an informal emergency food center
starts to maintain documentation of its activities and starts to require
documentation from its clients, the center is no longer "informal." With
legitimation, it may no longer be able to meet the same community needs it
was able to meet as an informal organization. Informal organizations are
successful and fill an important (albeit small) role primarily because they are
informal. They are able to work outside of the established social service
system and provide services to people who do not fit into the established
social service system's standard framework of eligibility criteria.
Once an organization chooses, because of a high level of demand for its
services, to accept federal surplus commodities to distribute to its clients,
the organization implicitly accepts the responsibility to maintain an inventory
system, and also accepts the responsibility to monitor and document client
eligibility. In making a commitment to distribute commodities, organizations
are diverting some of their efforts away from service provision and towards
administrative tasks.
These responsibilities adherent to accepting the new resource have an
impact on how the community organizations allocate their services. The
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organizations may no longer be able to serve the same constituents that they
had been able to provide for in the past.
By instituting documentation procedures and eligibility standards,
organizations may be cutting off services to the poorest segment of society.
People without social security numbers, people with limited literacy
intimidated by filling out forms, people confronting a language barrier, people
who live on the streets with no income and no documentation: these are all
people eliminated from a system that emphasizes documentation and standards
of accountability.
Traditionally, the emergency food network has been the only recourse for
the poor who live, for one reason or another, outside the system of
established social services. If the emergency food network, in response to
the Reagan Administration's truncation of social policies, becomes overly
bureaucratic and administratively oriented, it will not be able to provide the
same services, as it was before, to the very poor.
Formal eligibility determination, ironically, may serve to limit client
participation at the upper end of the income scale as well. The people
affected are the "working poor" - the people whose income is often just
above the eligibility standard for established social programs. The informal
food network is frequently the only resource available for these people who
may be very needy, even though they are working. They are doubly hurt:
first, because they are the ones cut from participation in social programs
through the Reagan Administration's budget cuts; and second, because they
are the ones denied participation in the emergency food network that, when
informal, had traditionally provided for those in need regardless of formal
eligibility standards.
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The availability of these federal commodities, therefore, threatens to
transform the emergency fooding network. The organizations in this network
now face a paradox: by participating in these programs, the organizations in
effect participate in and condone their own transformation. Their
participation further institutionalizes emergency feeding centers as an ongoing
and legitimate instrument of social policy. And yet any country that views
emergency soup kitchens, emergency food pantries, and free mass distributions
of butter and cheese as appropriate mechanisms for the implementation of
food and nutrition policy at the expense of more established food programs,
is a country that has thrown its entire social policy agenda into question.
The Reagan Administration's social policies generated a demand for food,
and then its agricultural policies created a supply driven program to
ostensibly meet that demand. Making the federal agricultural commodities
available through this supply driven program has had significant implications
for many of the community organizations feeding the hungry in Boston. The
organizations have had to rely on the commodities as one of the very few
public resources available to meet the needs of the hungry. When demand
was less, informal feeding centers could rely exclusively on private
contributions. With the explosion of demand, the organizations must depend
on public resources, although inadequate and inappropriate.
The high level of demand at emergency food centers and the long lines
of people waiting for the distribution of surplus commodities do not indicate
that there is a specific need for the expansion of these types of programs.
On the contrary, the increasing level of demand by the poor and hungry is
only an indicator of the lack of other resources available. Emergency food
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is, and should be, only a last resort for people, not a regular means of
support.
In looking at the operations of the emergency food network, therefore,
and in looking at the implementation of the commodities distribution program,
it is essential to look at the impacts that policies have on the actual
functioning of the organizations responsible for implementation, and to look at
the impacts that policies and programs have on the organizations' role in the
community.
Using the emergency food network to replace some of the functions of
established social service programs fails in several important ways. First, the
commodities distributions and the emergency food network can never work
towards alleviating structural poverty or the hunger that accompanies it.
These emergency food programs operate entirely outside the economic and
social structure, and therefore never function as a way of integrating the
poor back into the workings of society.
Second, emergency food programs do not have the same capacity to
provide massive ongoing support that the federal feeding programs do.
Under-funded social service agencies and the voluntary private sector can
never generate a level of services to match the federal government's service
reductions.
Finally, commodities distribution and bureaucratization threaten to change
the emergency food network, and threaten to restrict it from providing the
types of services that only an informal network can provide. The emergency
food network plays an extremely important role in society, but there is a
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danger that, because of transforming influences, emergency food providers
will lose their special and crucial place.
The Reagan Administration's particular blend of agricultural policies and
social policies have provided expanded resources for community organizations
that ultimately constrain these organizations' ability to provide crucial
services for their communities. The irony is that by providing food for the
hungry in the form of surplus agricultural commodities, and by expanding
services to the hungry in the form of legitimizing the informal feeding
network, the Reagan Administration may be making many of the hungry - and
the organizations that feed the hungry - worse off than they were.
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1 Food Policy, Vol, No.1 (February 1984), "Hunger: American as
Apple Pie?", p. 4.
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